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The Supreme Court 1997-1998
Labor and Employment Law Term
(Part II): The NLRA, Takings
Clause, and ADA Cases•
Marley S. Weiss**
I. Introduction
The 1997-1998 Supreme Court term had more than its share of significant employment-related cases, and assessed as a whole, it signals
some important trends indicative of future directions the Court may
take in the field of labor and employment law. Out of fifteen decisions
in cases raising at least one workplace law claim, 1 at least five merit
*A shorter version of this article was presented by the author as a portion of her
report as secretary of the Section of Labor and Employment Law of the American Bar
Association at the ABA Annual Meeting held in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, August 3,
1998.
**Marley S. Weiss is a Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of
Law. She served as Secretary of the Section of Labor and Employment Law of the ABA
in 1997-1998.
1. The computation of fifteen errs on the side of generosity in characterizing cases
as falling with the labor and employment law field. One is a per curiam decision in a
suit alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which resolved a constitutional issue of generally applicability
regarding the right to trial by jury and damage remedies, Hetzel v. Prince William County,
118 S. Ct. 1210 (1998). In two other cases with signed opinions, the Court resolved issues
of broad applicability, which happened to have arisen in a labor and employment law
context, but could just as easily have arisen in other settings: Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 204 7 (1998) (federal removal jurisdiction when state asserts
sovereign immunity in case arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging unconstitutional
termination of employment); Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998) (rejecting
"exculpatory no" defense in case arising out of criminal violation of Section 302 of the
LMRA). The other twelve cases include: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275
(1998) (Title Vll sexual harassment); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998)
(Title Vll sexual harassment); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998) (constitutional challenge to application of Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefits Act); Geissal
v. Moore Med. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1869 (1998) (COBRA benefits coverage); Air Line Pilots
Ass'n v. Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998) (ability ofRLA union to require non-members to
exhaust arbitral procedures as precondition to litigation to review union's determination
of amount assessable as fair share agency shop fees); Textron Lycoming Reciprocating
Engine Div'n, Avco Corp. v. United Auto Workers, 118 S. Ct. 1626 (1998) (federal jurisdiction under § 301 of the LMRA for union claim of employer fraud in the inducement to
enter into collective bargaining agreement); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (Title Vll sexual harassment); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 118 S. Ct.
966 (1998) §§ 1983 action for wrongful termination based on racially discriminatory
motive as well as in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights); Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998) (ADEA/OWBPA); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc.
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extended consideration, along with a sixth, non-employment-based
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADAf case with many ramifications
for workplace-related ADA actions. The three workplace sexual harassment cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 4 Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 5 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,6 along with a case
alleging sexual harassment in public education under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,7 Gebser v. Lago Independent School
District, 8 have been addressed in detail in Part I of this article, published
in the preceding issue of this journal. 9 Part II, presented here, will
address the remaining decisions of the term, focusing in particular on
the three non-sexual harassment cases of substantial significance to
the field oflabor and employment law: Allentown Mack Sales & Service,
Inc. v. NLRB, 10 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 11 and Bragdon v. A bbott. 12
InA llentown Mack, the Court addressed the lawfulness under theN ationa! Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of employer polling of its employees'
union sentiments, resolving issues of considerable substantive importance, legally and practically, in a decision carrying complicated and difficult administrative law implications. In Eastern Enterprises, the Court
held unconstitutional a provision of the Coal Industry Retiree Health
Benefits Act of 1992, which compelled former coal operator employers to
make payments to a fund to ensure the benefits of their former coal mining employees. The statute itself is of interest to only a narrow segment
of business and labor. However, the constitutional analysis of the four
member plurality, finding the provision violative of the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, and the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy,
finding the statute's retroactivity violative of Due Process, hold analytical significance for a broad array of labor and social legislation, as well
as other types of enactments. The ADA case, Bragdon v. Abbott, while
strictly speaking not an employment case at all, construes a series of prov. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998) (NLRA); LaChance v. Erickson, 118 S. Ct. 753 (1998)
(propriety of discharge of federal civil servant for separate offense oflying to investigators
in course ofinvestigation into underlying alleged on-the-job misconduct); Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 118 S. Ct. 542 (1997) (ERISA/
MPPAA withdrawal liability statute of limitations).
2. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12181-12189 (1998).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1998).
4. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
5. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
6. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
7. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1681-1688 (1998).
8. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
9. Marley S. Weiss, The Supreme Court 1997-1998 Labor and Employment Law
Term (Part 1): The Sexual Harassment Decisions, 14 THE LABoR LAw. 261, 267-315 (1998).
10. 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998).
11. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
12. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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visions of the ADA that are equally applicable under Title I, the employment portion of the statute. As the first major Supreme Court construction of the ADA, its precedential importance may in retrospect come to
resemble that of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 13 under Title VII.
This article will review the labor and employment law-related cases
decided during the 1997-1998 term. Next, it will briefly discuss the two
labor and employment law cases settled on the steps of the Supreme
Court, as well as several decided cases which arose under other laws,
but resolved issues pertinent to labor and employment law. Thereafter,
it will more closely scrutinize Allentown Mack, Eastern Enterprises,
and Bragdon v. Abbott. The concluding portion of the article will present
some general observations about the term as a whole, discerning some
trends among the decisions, and in the opinions of particular justices.

II. Overview of the Labor and Employment Law Decisions of
this Term
A. The Employment Discrimination Cases
Six cases before the Court had been pled in the trial court, in whole
or in part, as employment discrimination cases. However, only in four
did the Court on certiorari address substantive law issues on the merits.
In two others, the Court focused on issues more peripheral to the substantive claims. Three of the employment discrimination law decisions
have been discussed in detail elsewhere: Oncale, 14 Faragher, 15 and Ellerth/6 each of which involved claims that arose under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, addressing issues pertaining to sexual harassment in the workplace. 17
The Court decided only one Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)18 case, but one with considerable practical significance. Oubre
v. Entergy Operations, Inc. 19 interpreted the waiver provisions created
by the Older Worker Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA) amendments
of 1990 to the ADEA20 as precluding application of common law doctrines of ratification or equitable estoppel to require an ADEA plaintiff
to tender back monies received from the employer in conjunction with
an invalid waiver of ADEA claims. An ADEA plaintiff now cannot be
required to tender back monies received in conjunction with a release
13. 401 u.s. 424 (1971).
14. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
15. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
16. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.2257 (1998).
17. Discussion of the sexual harassment decisions may be found in Part I of this
review of the Supreme Court term, Weiss, supra note 9, at 267-315.
18. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-634 (1998).
19. 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998).
20. 29 u.s.c. § 626(0.
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as a condition of suit under the ADEA, if the waiver failed to strictly
comply with the criteria set forth in the OWBPA. 21
The Court also issued a per curiam decision in another employment
discrimination case, Hetzel v. Prince William County, 22 in which the
plaintiff had won a jury verdict under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.23
The district court reduced the jury award of damages from $750,000 to
$500,000. 24 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the imposition of
liability, but held the amount of the award grossly excessive in light
of the evidence, set it aside, and remanded for recalculation of the emotional distress component of damages. 25 The district court on remand
awarded plaintiff $50,000. The plaintiff declined this award in her motion for a new trial, treating the ruling as the equivalent of a remittitur
and asserting a Seventh Amendment right to a new trial. 26
The district court granted the new trial on the issue of damages. 27
However, the defendant then sought and obtained a writ of mandamus
in the Court of Appeals, ordering further recalculation of the damage
award in light of two highly restrictive Fourth Circuit precedents on
emotional distress damages. 28 The Fourth Circuit also ordered the district court, after recomputation of damages, to enter judgment without
the option ofretrial. 29 On certiorari, the Supreme Court accepted plaintiff's contention that this entry of judgment without the alternative of
a new trial violated plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to trial by
jury, following precedents regarding remittitur. 30
Bogan v. Scott-Harris31 arose out of a municipal employee's civil
rights action claiming discrimination based on race, as well as retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights. 32 The Court recognized
absolute legislative immunity as a defense available to municipal as
well as state and local governmental officials when acting in their legislative capacity. 33 The Court then broadly construed "legislative capacity," and consequently legislative immunity, to apply to the develop21. 118 S. Ct. at 84142. The Court left open to employers, however, the possibility
of asserting (counter)claims for restitution, recoupment, or setoff against employees. I d.
at 842. The Oubre Court also acknowledged the potential complications entailed in a
release that could be effective as to non-ADEA claims, but nugatory as to the ADEA
claims arising from the same termination decision. I d.
22. 118 S. Ct. 1210 (1998).
23. Id.
24. ld.
25. Id.
26. ld.
27. Id. at 1210-11.
28. ld. at 1211 & n.l.
29. I d. at 1211. Pursuant to the writ of mandamus, the district court thereupon
recomputed damages and entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $15,000. I d.
at 1211 n.l.
30. ld. at 1211-12.
31. 118 S. Ct. 966 (1998).
32. ld. at 969.
33. Id. at 969, 970-72.
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ment and adoption of a provision included within budget legislation
that was allegedly targeted to eliminate plaintiff's position because of
the employee's race or protected speech. 34
B. Benefits Cases Under the MPPAA and COBRA
Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar
Corp of California, Inc. 35 was the one Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) case of the term. The decision addressed
the problem of accrual and running of the statute of limitations in plan
lawsuits to enforce employer liability for unpaid withdrawal contributions under the Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act
(MPPAA). Reading the statute in a literal fashion, the Court held that
the cause of action does not accrue, hence the six year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plan trustees calculate the employer's withdrawal liability, establish the installment payment schedule
pertaining thereto, send the employer notice of the schedule and a demand for payment, and the employer fails to tender a payment by the
date when it is due. 36 Drawing on common law installment contract
doctrine, the Court further held that a new claim arises for each missed
payment. The pension plan in the case before the Court, therefore, was
time-barred only from recovering the frrst installment payment, due
slightly more than six years before the plan had filed suit, but could
recover all remaining overdue payments. 37
In another employee benefits-related case, Geissal v. Moore Med.
Corp., 38 a unanimous Court again read a statutory provision in a
straightforward and literal manner. 39 The Court held that only dependent or other health care coverage obtained by the former employee
after he or she attains eligibility pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) permits the employer to
avoid its COBRA obligation to provide continuing benefit coverage. 40
Preexisting spousal or other non-employment based coverage does not
34. I d. at 972-73. "Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act,
rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it." See also infra note 348
and accompanying text (discussing Bogan as an instance of the Court's greater sensitivity
this term to the concerns of public as opposed to private employer defendants).
35. 118 S. Ct. 542 (1997).
36. Id. at 549.
37. /d. at 551, 552-53.
38. 118 S. Ct. 1869 (1998).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(DXi), which provides that an employer may cease providing
COBRA continuation coverage as of "the date on which the qualified beneficiary first
becomes after the date of election ... covered under any other group health plan (as an
employee or otherwise)...."(emphasis added).
40. COBRA amended ERISA to require employers to afford plan beneficiaries under
the employer's group health insurance plan an opportunity to elect continuing coverage
upon termination of employment or certain other "qualifying events" that would otherwise cause cessation of their health care coverage. The employee or other beneficiary
must remit premiums to the employer, but continues coverage on the same terms as
provided during the employment relationship. 29 U.S.C. § 1163.
HeinOnline -- 14 Lab. Law. 537 1998-1999
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affect the employee's eligibility for COBRA benefits. The effect of Geissal is to leave it up to the employee the make his or her own comparative
assessment of benefits under alternatively available plans, and ascertain whether it is worth the cost of remitting to the former employer
the premium payments necessary to maintain the COBRA benefits. A
third benefits case, Eastern Enterprises, 41 will receive separate treatment as one of the more significant cases of this Term. 42

C. Collective Labor Relations
Three cases can be classified as collective labor relations matters:
Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller, 43 a union dues case, Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div'n, Avco Corp. v. United Automobile Workers,44 a Section 301 suit claiming fraudulent misrepresentation by the
employer in bargaining the labor contract, and Allentown Mack, 45 the
employer polling case under the NLRA. Discussion of Allentown Mack
will be deferred to a later portion of this work, where the decision will
receive the in-depth consideration it merits. 46
1. Union Dues
Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller41 held that a Railway Labor
Act (RLA) union cannot compel non-members to exhaust a union-devised
arbitral remedy as a_precondition to judicial litigation challenging the
union's determination of the percentage of its expenditures attributable
to collective bargaining and contract enforcement-related matters. This
determination, in turn, establishes the amount of an agency shop "fair
share" service fee in lieu of dues, lawfully chargeable to the non-member
fee payers. Since the non-members are parties to no agreement with the
union, much less one binding them to arbitrate the fee determination
disputes, the Court reasoned, the non-members cannot be compelled to
proceed in a purely voluntary, privately-established, arbitral forum.
This remains the case, the Court concluded, even though, at least under
the analogous line of public sector First Amendment-based caselaw,48
the Court has held unions to be required to provide objecting nonmembers with a dispute resolution forum presided over by an impartial
decisionmaker. 49

41. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
42. See infra Part V.
43. 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998).
44. 118 S. Ct. 1626 (1998).
45. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998).
46. See infra Part IV.
4 7. 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998).
48. See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986).
49. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1766-69.
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2. Fraud in the Inducement under Section 301
Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div'n, Avco Corp. v. United
Automobile Workers 50 involved the UAW's unsuccessful effort to obtain
federal jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) to litigate a tort damage claim for fraud in the inducement to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. During bargaining for a new labor contract, Textron allegedly had been repeatedly
asked by the union to provide information about the employer's plans
to subcontract work performed by union-represented employees, and
the employer had disclosed no such plans. Only a few months after
signing the new agreement, however, Textron announced its intention
to subcontract a sufficient volume of work to eliminate the jobs of about
half of the members of the bargaining unit at the facility. 51
Despite the long history of liberal construction of Section 301 to
establish a common law of the labor contract,52 the Court read the statute in accordance with its literal terms. "Suits for violation of contracts," the Court reasoned, cannot cover a claim alleging not that the
contract has been breached, but that it is invalid.53 This portion of the
opinion commanded the support of all nine justices.54
The majority left open the possibility that the union could strike
in violation of the contractual no-strike clause, and in a suit by the

50. 118 S. Ct. 1626 (1998).
51. Id. at 1628.
52. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). "Section
301 is not to be given a narrow reading." Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195,
199 (1962).
53. 118 S. Ct. at 1629. Several of the circuits, however, had previously reached the
opposite statutory construction. See, e.g., International B'hd of Teamsters Local 952 v.
American Delivery Serv. Co., 50 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1995) (claim by union of fraud
in the inducement to enter into collective bargaining agreement is not preempted by
§ 301 and is cognizable thereunder); Rozay's Transfer v. Local Freight Drivers, Local
208, 850 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989) (claim of
fraud in the inducement to enter into collective bargaining agreement may be brought
under§ 301); Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. Wilson, 915 F.2d 535, 538-39 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992) (same). See also, e.g., ffiEW Local 481 v.
Sign-Craft, Inc., 864 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1988) (overruling NDK Corp. v. Local1550, United
Food and Commercial Workers, 709 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1983), a case holding fraud in the
inducement not cognizable under § 301, in the course of holding that disputes over the
validity of collective bargaining agreements may be litigated under § 301); Mack Trucks,
Inc. v. International Union, UAW, 856 F.2d 579, 583, 587-90 (3d Cir. 1988) (§ 301 suit
to hold collective bargaining agreement valid states a claim).
54. Justice Stevens joined in the majority opinion, although he filed a separate
concurring opinion, discussed immediately infra, which asserted NLRA preemption as
an additional ground for reaching the construction of Section 301 adopted by the Court.
I d. at 1632. Justice Breyer was not a signatory to the majority opinion, but commenced
his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment with the statement, "I
agree with pages 1 through 5 of the Court's opinion," and differed with the majority only
as to its construction of the Declaratory Judgment Act. I d.
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employer, interpose the invalidity of the contract. 55 The union, however,
was plainly more interested in attaining federal jurisdiction in a suit
to recover tort damages for the employer's wrongfully inducing the
union to enter into the agreement in the first place, at a time when
the union's bargaining leverage presumably could have been deployed
to greater effect.
The Court rejected an alternative argument for federal jurisdiction, based on the union's reading of the Declaratory Judgment Act 56
together with Section 301. In light of the posture of the case, the Court
viewed the matter as failing to present a live case or controversy to
support a declaration of voidability of the agreement on grounds of
fraud. 57 As the Court noted, the real interests of each party were
adverse to those entailed in litigating the voidability of the labor
contract. The employer vigorously disputed the underlying fraud allegations but had "no interest in defending the binding nature of the
contract," while the union had no real "interest in establishing the
nonbinding nature of the contract." 58
As far as it appears, the company that had just eliminated the work
of half its Williamsport employees would have been perfectly willing
to be excused from a contract negotiated when the Union was in a
stronger bargaining position, and the Union. had no intent or disposition to exercise a theoretical option to avoid a contract that was better
than what it could negotiate anew. The fact that the fraud damages
claim, ifsuccessful, would establish a voidability that (as far as appears)
no one cared about, does not make the question of voidability a "case
of actual controversy". . .. 59

Eight justices declined, therefore, to resolve the question of whether
there would be federal jurisdiction over a similar action had the union
threatened a strike in protest against the subcontracting decision,
thereby creating a potentially live case or controversy as to whether
the union was bound by the no-strike provision of the agreement. 60
Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer, concurring only in the judgment on this point, would have reached the issue. He would have permitted suit, seeking a declaration of invalidity of the contract, had a strike
been imminent. His opinion is vague about whether and on what basis
such an action could support a claim for a tort damage remedy. His
concurrence does state the view, however, that had the union shown
that a strike and consequent breach of contract suit at the behest of
the employer was "imminent ... the Declaratory Judgment Act ...
would have authorized the District Court to adjudicate this contro55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

ld.
28 u.s.c. § 2201.
Id. at 1631.
ld.
Id.
ld.
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versy." 61 Justice Breyer may well contemplate that coupling a claim
pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act with Section 301 jurisdiction
would support a tort damage remedy in addition to a declaration that
the collective bargaining agreement is invalid. 62 The majority opinion,
on the other hand, in extended dicta, expresses considerable skepticism
about the assumptions required to reach this result. 63
At least so long as a union fails to demonstrate any intention imminently to strike over the subcontracting, all nine justices hold no federal
cause of action will lie under Section 301 and the Declaratory Judgment
Act. 64 The Court declined to address the union's conclusory assertion
in a footnote of its brief, not presented in the petition for certiorari, that
an alternative source of federal jurisdiction might be found under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 which provides for general federal questionjurisdiction. 65
The underlying question, however, remains unaddressed in Textron:
is an intentional tort damage action based on fraud in the inducement to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement consistent with the federal
labor relations scheme? Dismissal for lack of federal court jurisdiction
pretermits the substantive construction of Section 301, the federal common law of the labor agreement, as well as federal labor policy arising
from the LMRA, to either support or preclude the tort cause of action.
It may be, however, that without ever reaching this policy issue on the
merits, the holding in Textron on a formal, doctrinal level precludes a
holding that the LMRA preempts the state tort claim.
The Court's implicit construction of Section 301 is that it has no
applicability to claims based on the negotiation rather than the implementation of the collective bargaining agreement. Assuming there is
no federal jurisdiction over claims based on fraud in the bargaining
process, it would follow that if filed in state court, such claims cannot
be removed to federal court. Logic might also suggest that there is no
basis to assert complete or other preemption under the LMRA as to
such tort allegations, since the Textron Court's construction of Section
61. Id. at 1632.
62. Were a majority of the Court to adopt this position in a subsequent case, it might
assure the union of the ability to litigate the claim for intentional tort damages for the
alleged fraud. The implication of the Supreme Court decision in Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Mullens, 455 U.S. 72 (1982), is that where necessary to determine the merits of a defense
to a Section 301 action, the courts may construe the NLRA to establish the lawfulness
thereunder of the contract provision whose enforcement is sought. Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1952), holds that where a claim of violation of a provision
of the collective bargaining agreement also constitutes a violation of the NLRA, federal
courts retain Section 301 jurisdiction, and the NLRB's jurisdiction is not exclusive. See
generally II THE DEVELOPING LABoR LAw 1208-11 (3d ed. 1992) (Patrick Hardin, ed.·in-chieO
(hereinafter cited as DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]; id., 1997 Supp. at 601-13.
63. Textron, 118 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
64. ld. at 1631 (majority opinion); id. at 1632 (Breyer, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 1629 n.l. Apart from the NLRA itself, however, it is difficult to imagine
another source for federal question jurisdiction in such a case, and direct reliance on the
NLRA would certainly highlight the NLRA preemption problem.
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301 makes it clear that claims offraud in the inducement to enter into
the agreement fall wholly outside the scope of the statute. 66
One must question whether the Court should resolve such fundamental issues offederallabor policy, however, through literal statutory
construction, inconsistent with the more generous interpretative approach the Court's precedents have taken with the same statute, as
well as without consideration on the merits of the competing policy
considerations. It is also ironic that the Court's decisions may well have
vitiated the line of lower court cases holding Section 301 to preempt
intentional tort claims based on allegations such as fraud in the inducement to enter into the collective bargaining agreement; 67 the union no
doubt consciously framed the Textron case so as to avoid that line of
decisions, as well as those arising under the NLRA.
The NLRA's Garmon68 preemption, it should be noted, may still
apply to tort litigation of this type, although the defense would be adjudicable only through the state courts. Indeed, Justice Stevens, concurring,
found the Section 301 pleading to so clearly state a claim for employer
breach of the duty to bargain in good faith that he relied on the Board's
primary jurisdiction as a further ground for rejecting the construction

66. Cf Voilas v. General Motors Corp., _ _ F.3d _ , 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
3339, *18 n.1 (3d Cir. March 3, 1999) (noting that Textron's narrow construction of
§ 301 jurisdiction "suggests a correspondingly narrow scope for preemption," because
"jurisdiction under § 301 is the obverse of preemption."). One should note in addition
that no construction of the agreement is necessary to determine whether the employer
intentionally misrepresented or concealed facts material to its bargaining partner in
negotiating the labor contract. These cases therefore fall outside the rationale of the line
of LMRA preemption cases stemming from Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
See Lingle v. Magic Chef, Norge Div'n, 486 U.S. 399 (1988); United Steelworkers v.
Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990). See also Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994)
(RLA).

67. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 943 F.2d 764, 768-71 (7th Cir.
1991) (§ 301 preempted suit by 22 former employees claiming that employer had fraudulently induced them to move from New Jersey to Indiana under collective bargaining
agreement transfer option provision, by false assurances of stable employment); with,
e.g., Voilas v. General Motors Corp., _ _ F.3d at _ _, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3339,
at *19-29 (3d Cir. March 3, 1999) (following Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386
(1987), to hold that § 301 preemption does not apply to individual retired employee plaintiffs' claims that GM fraudulently induced them to accept early retirement package by
falsely asserting plant would soon close); Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d
217, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1995) (employee fraud claims based on employer promise that employees would retain jobs if they decertified union held not preempted under § 301); Wells
v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 172-75 (6th Cir. 1989) (individual employees'
claims that employer fraudulently induced them to accept voluntary termination plan
by false assurances regarding future reemployment prospects held not preeempted under
§ 301); International B'hd of Teamsters Local 952 v. American Delivery Serv. Co., 50
F.3d 770, 774 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995) (union claims of fraudulent inducement to enter
collective bargaining agreement not preempted by § 301); Rozay's Transfer v. Local
Freight Drivers, Local 208, 850 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1030 (1989) (employer's claims of fraud in the inducement not preempted by § 301).
68. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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of Section 301 urged by the union. 69 Given the turns and twists the
Court has taken with preemption doctrine, however, speculation about
labor preemption matters not specifically decided by the Court must
be regarded as just that-speculation.
D. Other Labor and Employment Law Decisions: No "Exculpatory
No" Either in Federal Criminal Law or in Federal Employment
In LaChance v. Erickson, 70 addressing the consolidated cases of several terminated federal employees, the Court rejected the employees'
contention that the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause precluded
federal agencies from not only charging their employees with misconduct on the job, but separately further charging them and eventually
discharging them for making false statements in the course of the
agency's investigation into the alleged original, underlying misconduct.
In Brogan v. United States, 71 a union representative had made false
statements to a federal investigator in the course of an investigation
into allegations that the union official had received payments from an
69. ld. at 1631-32 (Stevens, J., concurring). But cf, e.g., Belknap, Inc., v. Hale,
463 U.S. 491 (1983) (state has a "substantial interest in protecting its citizens from
misrepresentations that have caused them grievous harm," holding replacement workers'
state tort claim against employer for fraudulent misrepresentation of their "permanent"
status not preempted by NLRA); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 436
U.S. 180, 193-94 (1978) (Garmon "arguably protected" rationale "has its greatest force
when applied to state laws regulating the relations between employees, their union,
and their employer," rather than "laws of general applicability which are occasionally
invoked in connection with a labor dispute," such as common law intentional torts
doctrine). Among the many circuit court decisions, compare, e.g., Voilas, _ _ F .3d at
_ _, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3339, at 29-36 (no NLRA preemption of retired employees'
claims of fraudulent inducement to accept early retirement package by falsely asserting
plans to imminently close the plant); Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d at 170-72
(individual employees' claims that employer fraudulently induced them to accept voluntary termination plan held not preempted by NLRA); with, e.g., Parker v. Connors Steel
Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1516-18 (11th Cir. 1988) (claim of fraudulent inducement of union
to enter into concessionary agreement held preempted by NLRA), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1066 (1989); Kolentus v. Avco Corp., 798 F.2d 949, 960-62 (7th Cir. 1986) (claim based
on fraudulent failure to disclose intent to close plant in the course of negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement held preempted under Garmon preemption rationale);
Serrano v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 790 F.2d 1279, 1286-88 (6th Cir. 1986) (claims
of fraud in the inducement to enter concessionary collective bargaining agreement based
on employer promises to keep plant open held subject to NLRA Garmon preemption).
Following precedent set in William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of Jacksonville, 417 U.S. 12, 15-18 (1974) and Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197
(1962), some circuits had treated allegations ofNLRA Garmon preemption as no obstacle
to § 301 jurisdiction over such claims. See, e.g., American Delivery Serv. Co., 50 F.3d at
773-74; Rozay's Transfer, 850F.2d at 1326, ffiEW, Local481 v. Sign-Craft, Inc., 864 F.2d
499, 503 (7th Cir. 1988); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. International Union, UAW, 856 F.2d 579,
585-86 (3d Cir. 1988). This line of reasoning will no longer shelter claims offraud in the
inducement from NLRA preemption, however, in light of Textron, although it remains
open to the courts to rely on Belknap and draw sufficient distinction between the nature
of the potential NLRA claim and the nature of the state tort theory to contend that
Garmon preemption is inapplicable.
70. 118 S. Ct. 753 (1998).
71. 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
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employer in violation of Section 302 72 of the LMRA. The union representative was convicted of making false statements, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001, in addition to his conviction of the underlying criminal
violation of Section 302. 73 In a five to four decision authored by Justice
Scalia, with Justice Kennedy providing the fifth vote, the Court rejected
the "exculpatory no" exception to the federal criminal statute for mere
denial of wrongdoing, 74 a doctrine developed and concurred in by several
Circuit Courts. 75 The Supreme Court held that targets may either remain silent or assert their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, but may not deliberately lie, even if not un<ier oath,
without risking prosecution. 76 Neither the statute, nor Fifth Amendment due process, the majority concluded, was violated by such a statutory construction. 77 The holding in Brogan may be seen as the criminal
law analogue to LaChance v. Erickson. 78

III. The Penumbra around the Labor and Employment Law
Decisions: Settled Cases and Non-Employment Cases
A. The Term That Might Have Been-Settled Cases
Fifteen out of ninety-one cases, or 16% of the Court's docket this
year, grew out of cases in which labor and employment issues had been
pled in the trial court. If one counts only the thirteen cases in which the
Supreme Court actually decided labor and employment-related issues,
twelve of the cases, or 13% qualify as labor and employment law decisions. By historical standards, this year's percentage pales in comparison to the 20% or 25% of the Court's docket typically occupied by labor
cases twenty or thirty years ago. On the other hand, compared to recent
years, the proportion of labor and employment matters this year was
rather large.79 Moreover, the high visibility and social as well as legal
72. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1997).
73. 118 S. Ct. at 808.
74. I d. at 808-10. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas were
also in the majority. Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred in the judgment on the
basis that "a false denial fits the unqualified language of 18 U.S.C. § 1001," but urged
Congress to reconsider the provision in light of its potential for abuse by prosecutors "to
manufacture crimes." Id. at 812.
75. I d. at 808. See Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469, 473 (7th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Equila-Juarez, 851
F.2d 122, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 717-19 (11th Cir.
1986), United States v. Fiztgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880-81 (lOth Cir. 1980); United States
v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1975).
76. I d. at 810.
77. ld. at 808-10.
78. 118 S. Ct. 753 (1998).
79. A review of my predecessors' presentations at the annual meeting provides some
appropriate comparison data. In 1990-1991, twenty-two out of 112 cases on the Supreme
Court's docket, or about twenty per cent were labor and employment law cases. Stephen
Mazurak, The Status of the Employment Relationship: The 1990-1991 Supreme Court
Term, 7 THE LABoR LAW. 849, 853 (1992). In 1991-1992, eighteen cases raised labor and
employment law questions. Roger A. Hartley, Foreword: The Supreme Court's 1991-1992
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significance of the sexual harassment cases, the precedential importance of Allentown Mack, the constitutional implications of Eastern
Enterprises, and the strong employment discrimination law implications of the ADA public accommodations case, Bragdon v. Abbott, make
this a Supreme Court term to remember for labor and employment
lawyers.
Had the parties not settled two additional cases in which the Court
had already granted certiorari, the proportionate significance of this
term would have been greater still. The UAW and Caterpillar, in the
course of settling the hundreds of unfair labor practices cases as well
as other litigation still unresolved between them when they finally
concluded a new collective bargaining agreement, also settled a case
before the Supreme Court. 8 Caterpillar had sought a declaratory judgment that its long-standing collective bargaining agreement provision
providing paid leave of absence for full-time union committeepersons
and grievance chairpersons, in which the union officials were paid the
equivalent of the regular wages and fringe benefits they would have
earned had they remained on the job, violated the criminal prohibition
of Section 302 of the LMRA. 81 Besides the potential implications of such
a decision for criminal law enforcement, such a declaratory judgment
could have allowed employers with similar contract provisions to claim
they were void as against public policy, and hence unenforceable, in
labor arbitration and Section 301 suits. In addition, employers could
have resisted union efforts to negotiate or maintain such provisions
during bargaining for new collective bargaining agreements by raising
their illegality as a defense to any claim that the employer had refused

°

Labor and Employment Law Term, 8 THE LABoR LAW. 739, 745 n.27 (1992). In 1992-1993,
labor and employment law cases dropped both as an absolute number and as a percentage
of the docket. Only ten out of 125 rulings and 108 full opinions dealt with matters in
this field. Janice R. Bellace, The Supreme Court 1992-1993 Term: A Review of Labor and
Employment Law Cases, 9 THE LABOR LAw. 603, 603 (1993). The 1993-1994 docket included
eleven workplace-related disputes, see Joseph R. Grodin, 1993-1994 Supreme Court Labor
and Employment Law Term, 10 THE LABoR LAw. 693, 693 (1994). In 1995-1996, twelve
out of seventy-five cases decided by the Court involved workplace-related matters. Michael
Gottesman, Labor, Employment, and Benefits Decisions ofthe Supreme Court's 1995-1996
Term, 12 THE LABoR LAw. 325, 327 (1997). In 1996-1997, the Court's overall caseload
bottomed out at seventy-four, see Keith N. Hylton, Labor and the Supreme Court: Review
of the 1996-1997 Term, 13 THE LABoR LAw. 263,264 (1997), of which at least twelve are
fairly categorized as labor and employment cases. I d. at 297 (counting a total of seven
decisions arising under Title Vll, NLRA, and ERISA); id. at 272-95 (discussing eleven
cases arising under various workplace-related laws, together with several public sector
cases, only two of which involved an employee-employer dispute; the others involved
immunity issues pertaining to the liability of public employers or public employees to
third parties).
80. Caterpillar v. International Union, United Auto Workers, 107 F.3d 1052 (3d
Cir.1997)(en bane), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 31 (1997), cert. dismissed pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 46.1, 118 S. Ct. 1350 (1998).
81. ld. at 1053.
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to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(aX5) of the NLRA,82
and by charging the union with violating Section 8(bX3) of the NLRA
if it demanded inclusion of such an illegal provision in an agreement,
or bargained for or reached impasse over its inclusion.
Of far broader significance, however, would have been a Supreme
Court decision in Piscataway Township Board o{Education v. Tax man. 83
The settlement of the Piscataway case eliminated what would have been
a seventh employment discrimination case from the Court's docket.
Observers widely regarded that case as having the potential to produce
a landmark judicial re-examination of United Steelworkers v. Weber84
and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County. 85 These
precedents had interpreted Title VII as permitting moderate forms of
race and sex-based affirmative action preferences so long as they were
not intended to attain rather than maintain racial or gender balance,
and did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests" of non-preferred employees. Dismissals based on settlement by the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46.1 are relatively unusual; the fact that there were
two this term within the labor and employment law field, including
one of such an exceptionally high profile, is extraordinary. Together
with the fifteen decided cases, they may also suggest a renewed and
heightened interest among the Justices in issues arising in the labor
and employment field.
B. Non-Labor Cases of Special Significance to Labor and
Employment Law Specialists
In addition to the cases litigating claims of violations of labor or
employment laws or defenses thereto, there were several Supreme
Court cases this term in which other types of claims were alleged, but
which nevertheless hold considerable significance for labor and employment lawyers. I have already mentioned the Title IX sexual harassment
vicarious liability case, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District.86 Another important case, Baker v. General Motors Corp., 87 involved the company's unsuccessful effort to apply the Full Faith and
Credit clause of the Constitution to enforce a Michigan court injunction
obtained in the course of settlement of a former employee's wrongful
82. See 107 F.3d at 1054. Indeed, a precipitating factor behind Caterpillar's institution of federal court litigation was the union's filing of Section 8(aX5) refusal to bargain
in good faith charges when the employer unilaterally ceased making such payments,
after a nationwide collective bargaining dispute between the parties resulted in the union
members working without a labor contract.
83. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane), cerL granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), cerL
dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46.1, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
84. 443 u.s. 193 (1979).
85. 480 u.s. 616 (1987).
86. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). This decision is discussed in Weiss, supra note 9, at
275-88.
87. 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998).

HeinOnline -- 14 Lab. Law. 546 1998-1999

1997-98 Court Term(Partll): NLRA, Takings Clause, and ADA

547

termination lawsuit in a Missouri products liability action. The Michigan injunction would have precluded the former employee from testifying against the employer. 88 The Supreme Court held that the interest
of the second state in full access to potential evidence in its judicial
search for the truth outweighed Michigan's interest in enforcing its
injunction prohibiting the former employee's testimony. 89 The Court
recognized this situation as entailing an exception to the usual Full
Faith and Credit clause requirement that such foreign judgments be
enforced as though they were the second state's own.90
General Electric Co. v. Joiner91 arose out of a products liability action
against producers of chemicals and equipment used in the workplace
by an employee who allegedly suffered cancer from on-the-job exposure.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve issues of appropriate
expert witness testimony in such a context, and upheld broad discretion
vested in the district court regarding such rulings. 92
In Crawford-el v. Britton,93 a Section 1983 prisoner's rights case, a
five to four majority of the Court rejected a clear and convincing evidence standard or other heightened burden of proof for plaintiffs seeking
to establish constitutional tort claims against government officials
where motive is the gravamen of the claim. Because many cases of
unconstitutional government action turning on motives are employment cases, this holding is an important one for labor and employment
law specialists.
Likewise significant are this term's ADA cases. In Bragdon v. Abbott,94 a suit by an HIV-infected patient against her dentist under the
public accommodations provisions of the ADA, the Court rendered a
series of interpretations which, while technically involving another portion of the statute, will be followed under the employment provisions
contained in Title I. This opinion is likely to become a landmark ADA
decision, and will be addressed in depth below.
A second, non-employment ADA case, Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 95 should also be mentioned. There, in an opinion written
by Justice Scalia, a unanimous Court held that the Title II ADA prohibition against disability-based discrimination by a "public entity" against
a "qualified individual with a disability" applies to state prisons as
public entities and to prison inmates. Reasoning literally from the text
of the statute, the Court concluded that prison inmates may be deemed
"qualified individuals with a disability," hence protected against dis88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

ld.
ld. at 667-68.
ld. at 668.
118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
ld. at 515.
118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998).
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998).
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crimination, provided they are qualified or eligible to participate in the
particular prison benefit or opportunity. In Yeskey, the plaintiff had
been refused admission to a motivational bootcamp, which could have
substantially shortened his period of incarceration, because of his medical history of hypertension. The Court, however, expressly declined to
reach the question of whether application of the ADA to state prisons
is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Interstate
Commerce clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. 96
This article now turns to a deeper examination of the most significant cases: the NLRA case, Allentown Mack, the employee benefits unconstitutional takings case, Eastern Enterprises, and the ADA case,
Bragdon v. Abbott.
IV. Allentown Mack
In Allentown Mack Sales & Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 91 the Court addressed the NLRB's requirement that an employer
have a "good faith reasonable doubt, based on objective considerations,"
that the incumbent union continued to enjoy the support of a majority of
the employees before the employer could permissibly poll the employees'
union sentiment. The Board's standard was upheld, but its application
to the facts in the case at bar was overturned. 98
The case arose after Mack Trucks sold its Allentown, Pennsylvania
operations to a group of its managers who founded Allentown Mack
Sales and Service, Inc. The Mack Truck service and parts employees
had been represented by Machinists Local Lodge 724 and the newly
created employer hired thirty-two of the forty-five employees who had
constituted the bargaining unit under Mack Trucks. 99
Because Allentown Mack was a successor employer to Mack
Trucks, 100 the union was entitled to be treated as an incumbent union

96. Id. at 1956.
97. 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998).
98. ld. at 829.
99. Id. at 820·21. Every employee initially hired was a former Mack employee.
Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 1483, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
100. After trial on the union's unfair labor practice charges, the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ), aft1rmed by the Board, found Allentown Mack to be a successor employer.
316 N.L.R.B. 1199, 1199, 1204 (1995). This finding was not challenged before the Court
of Appeals, see 118 S. Ct. at 834 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
hence was not at issue before the Supreme Court. The employer satisfied both the "hired a
majority ofthepredecessor's employees" test, see Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees,
Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249,263 (1974), and the "majority of the employees
hired by the new employer" test. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serve., 406 U.S. 272, 281
(1972); Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 41 (1987). See
generally DEVELOPING LABoR LAW, supra note 62, at 781-851.
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which had no collective bargaining agreement in effect. 101 Allentown
Mack was required to assume its predecessor's duty to bargain in good
faith with the union, and the union was entitled to the benefit of a
rebuttable presumption of continued majority status. 102
Soon after Allentown Mack rehired a majority of the bargaining unit
employees and commenced operations, the union demanded recognition
and requested commencement of bargaining for a new labor contract. 103
The employer, in a written reply, refused to bargain, asserted a good
faith doubt as to the union's majority status, and advised the union of
its arrangements for "an independent poll by secret ballot of its hourly
employees to be conducted under guidelines prescribed by the National
Labor Relations Board." 104
Allentown Mack arranged for a Catholic priest to conduct a poll of
the employees' support for the union. The union lost by a vote of 19 to
13. 105 The employer then relied on the outcome to reiterate its refusal
to bargain with the union, claiming a demonstrated lack of majority
status. The union filed unfair labor practice charges. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), affirmed by the Board, found the employer to have
conducted the poll in procedural compliance with the NLRB's Struksnes
requirements, 106 but held that the employer had lacked a reasonable
doubt, based on objective considerations, that the union retained the
support of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. 107 The polling,
and the refusal to bargain based on its results, were therefore held to
have violated § § 8(aX1) and 8(aX5). 108
The D.C. Circuit panel, with one member in dissent, enforced the
Board's order .109 The Court of Appeals rejected the employer's challenge
to the Board's standard for polling, despite conflicting precedent in three
other Circuits. 110 The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had adopted a
weaker predicate for employer polling, that polls are permitted if the
101. See Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp., 482 U.S. at 38-40 (same policies in
favor of preserving industrial peace, stability of the bargaining relationship, and avoiding
providing the employer with incentives to delay bargaining in hopes of undermining
support for the union apply in incumbent union setting and in successorship context,
and lead to application of duty to bargain in good faith based on presumption of continued
majority status).
102. See id. at 41 & n.8. See generally DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 62, at
790-97.
103. Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 821.
104. ld.
105. ld.
106. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
107. Allentown Mack, 316 N.L.R.B. at 1199.
108. Id.
109. 83 F.3d at 1488.
110. 83 F.3d at 1485-87 (citing NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 651 F.2d 1141 (5th
Cir. 1981); Thomas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1982); Mingtree Restau·
rant, Inc. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1984)).
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employer has "substantial, objective evidence of a loss of union support"
as opposed to loss of union majority status. 111 The Court of Appeals
likewise found substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support
the Board's conclusion that only seven of thirty-two bargaining unit
employees had been shown to have declined to support the union, prior
to the polling, an insufficient number to support a good faith, reasonable
doubt of continued majority status. 112 A narrowly divided Supreme
Court reversed, upholding the traditional formulation of the polling
standard, but overturning its application. 113
The majority decision was written by Justice Scalia, with two separate groups of four Justices joining in each of the two key holdings, to
produce a majority opinion whose entirety was subscribed to only by
Justice Scalia. The portion of the opinion upholding the NLRB standard,
Part II, was joined in by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer;
the portion rejecting the Board's application of the standard, and holding that the employer had a sufficient objective basis to poll the workforce, Parts III and IV of the opinion, was joined in by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, along with Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.
A. The NLRB Standard
Justice Scalia's reasoning upholding the NLRB polling standard
starts with the recitation of conventional formulae requiring judicial
deference to the NLRB's construction of the Act: "courts must defer to
the requirements imposed by the Board if they are 'rational and consistent with the Act,' " 114 and provided that "the Board's 'explication is
not inadequate, irrational or arbitrary.' " 115
The NLRB has applied the same criteria to employer polling, employer petitions for a representation election (RM petition) when there is
an incumbent union, and unilateral employer withdrawal of recognition
and refusal to bargain with an incumbent union when no collective
bargaining agreement is in effect. 116 In all three situations, absent a
contract bar, certification bar, or recognition bar, 117 the Board treats
the employer as having to overcome the incumbent union's rebuttable
111. 83 F.3d at 1485-86 & 1486 n.3 (citing A. W. Thompson, 651 F.2d at 1145; Thomas
Indus., Inc., 687 F.2d at 869; Mingtree Restaurant, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1299).
112. Id. at 1487-88.
113. 118 S. Ct. at 829.
114. I d. at 822 (quoting Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S.
27' 42 (1987)).
115. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)).
116. See Texas Petrochemicals Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1989), enfd as modified,
923 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1991).
117. The three year contract bar, the one year bar following certification, and the
bar for "a reasonable period" of time to negotiate an initial contract after voluntary
recognition of the union by the employee each entitle the union to the benefit of an
irrebuttable presumption of majority status for the duration of the bar period. See generally
I DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 62, at 571-73.
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presumption of continued majority support. The employer must rely on
objective evidence sufficient to raise a good faith reasonable doubt of
the union's majority status. 118
The five members of the Supreme Court who were in accord on this
point found the Board's application of a single standard to polling, RM
petitions, and withdrawals of recognition to be rational, hence entitled
to deference, despite the fact that it was less than a model of logical
consistency .119 The employer had argued that if the same showing was
required to poll as to withdraw recognition, polling was rendered useless
for the only purpose for which it is permitted by the NLRB: to establish
the union's loss of majority support as a defense to a bad faith bargaining
charge when the employer withdraws recognition. The Court, however,
accepted the reasonableness of the Board's view that polling is "disruptive" to established bargaining relationships as well as "unsettling to
employees." The Court also recognized that there are other reasons to
justify polling, even when polling is limited to ascertaining employee
union sentiment. Such reasons may include preserving good employee
morale and a semblance of employee freedom of choice, and avoiding
a pyrrhic victory for the employer of validly withdrawing recognition
followed by the union winning a victory in an NLRB election. 120
The core of the employer's argument was that the test for polling
should be lower than that for unilateral employer withdrawal of recognition. This contention was deemed less persuasive when juxtaposed with
a comparison between the standard for polling and that for seeking an
RM election. As the Court of Appeals elaborated more explicitly than
the Supreme Court, it is difficult to reject the logic of the argument
that the employer should not be allowed to conduct a poll-which has the
same purpose as an RM election, but lacks the procedural protectionswhen the Board would refuse to conduct an RM election. 121 The Supreme
Court majority acknowledged that the RM election/polling comparison
could yield competing arguments for either higher or lower standards
for one versus the other, and concluded: "if it would be rational for
the Board to set the polling standard either higher or lower than the
threshold for an RM election, then surely it is not irrational for the
Board to split the difference." 122
The four dissenters on this issue, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, disputed the statutory textual basis for the Board's standard
which they asserted in fact operates to interfere with employee free
118. See generally Joan Flynn, A Triple Standard at the NLRB: Employer Challenges
to an Incumbent Union, 1991 WJB. L. REV. 653.
119. A useful discussion of the competing comparisons and their rationales may be
found in Flynn, supra note 118, at 660.
120. 118 S. Ct. at 809.
121. Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1486 (following Texas Petrochemical Corp., 296
N.L.R.B. at 1060).
122. 118 S. Ct. at 823.

HeinOnline -- 14 Lab. Law. 551 1998-1999

552

14 THE LABoR LAWYER 533 (1999)

choice. 123 Alternatively, the dissent as to this part of the decision reasoned that, in light of the gravity of the consequences, the application of
an identical standard to polling, RM elections, and unilateral employer
withdrawal of recognition is irrational. The dissenters contended that
because of the one year election bar, the consequences of a lost RM
election for the union are more severe than that of polling. They conclude, therefore, that the polling standard should be set lower than that
for either RM elections or withdrawal of recognition. 124 Chief Justice
Rehnquist' s opinion alludes to NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 125 to advance
a suggestion that employer polling may be subject to § 8(c) and First
Amendment free speech protections, based on the employer's right to
receive information, by analogy to the union's similar right in other
contexts. 126 The mere presence of a constitutional concern, these four
justices would hold, renders "the Board's interpretation of the Act
... not entitled to deference." 127
The dissent, however, mentions neither Gissel nor Linden Lumber128
when it impliedly equates the reliability of a unilateral instrument, the
employer-conducted poll, with that of an election conducted by a neutral
governmental agency. 129 Only when the employer's unfair labor practices "impair the electoral process" are a union's authorization cards accepted as a second-best measure to ascertain and effectuate employee representation wishes and bind the employer to a duty to bargain. 130 Neither
union authorization cards, nor a ballot conducted independently at the
behest of the union, will bind an unconsenting employer to bargain. 131
Four justices, however, would permit an employer's unilaterallyconducted poll to bind an unconsenting union and employees, to the extent that the employer would be entitled to terminate the bargaining relationship without prior invocation of NLRB processes.
The fifth Justice, Scalia, seemingly felt duty bound by administrative law precepts to defer to the NLRB's judgment to the contrary on
the matter of statutory interpretation embodied in the text of the polling
standard. Along with these four dissenters, however, in the remainder
123. Id. at 831.
124. Id. at 832.
125. 395 u.s. 575, 616-17 (1969).
126. 118 S. Ct. at 832-33.
127. Id. at 833 (citing, inter alia, Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,574-77 (1988); and NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1979)).
128. Linden Lumber v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
129. See Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 831-32.
130. Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 304, 306, 310. See also Gissel, 395 U.S. at 601-609
(despite inferiority of cards to Board-conducted election as a reliable indicator of employee
sentiment, cards are sufficiently valid to provide a substitute measure of employee sentiment when employer unfair labor practices have substantially reduced the possibility
of a fair election).
131. Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 310. See generally I DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 62, at 558-60; id., 1997 Supp. at 214.
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of his opinion he overturns in practice the polling standard he purports
to approve in theory.
B. Rejection of Application of the Polling Standard: The Dictionary
as Primary Interpretative Source
In Parts III and IV of the opinion, Justice Scalia, this time joined by
the Chief Justice, along with Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas,
overturns the Board's finding that the employer had failed to demonstrate its good faith doubt of the union's majority status based on objective evidence. Justice Scalia rejected the Board's own construction of
its use of the phrase "good faith doubt," to mean "disbelief." He relied
on Webster's New International Dictionary to support instead the interpretation of "uncertainty," rather than affirmative denial of belief in
the truth of the assertion. 132 One could characterize the approach of the
majority opinion to interpretation of the Board's test, which the Board
had articulated through the adjudicatory process, as akin to Justice
Scalia's strict, literal method of construction of a congressionallyenacted statute.
Justice Scalia couples the reinterpretative analysis of the "good
faith doubt" standard with a recasting of the judicial review test of
Universal Camera Corp. 133 "Substantial evidence on the record as a
whole" is transmuted into "whether on this record it would have been
possible for a reasonable jury to reach the Board's conclusion. " 134 Courts
of Appeals have treated this as a standard of review of fact-finding
highly deferential to the agency. 135 However, under this approach, the
Board's expertise in the field of industrial relations is written out of
any role in evaluating evidence. 136 Moreover, the Court's language
construing the "substantial evidence" standard of judicial review to
require that the Board not ignore or underweight pertinent record evidence137 lends itself to expansive judicial reassessment of NLRB factfinding determinations and evaluative judgrnents. 138
In the course of a few lines, the opinion restates and transforms the
basis for the NLRB ruling against Allentown Mack. In the original,
132. Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 823.
133. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
134. 118 S. Ct. at 823.
135. See, e.g., Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999, 1004 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) ("[T]his is a highly deferential standard of review.")
136. See Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 834 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. ld. at 828. See infra text accompanying notes 179-187.
138. See, e.g., Pirelli Cable Corp. v. NLRB, 141 F.3d 503, 519 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing
Allentown Mack to support its reasoning that "the Board interpreted the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Union. The Board is not at liberty to accept only those evidentiary inferences that support the union's position and reject all of those that support the
employer. Based upon the evidence before the Board, no reasonable person could have
concluded that the membership of the union struck over the employer's alleged threat
of discharge if the employees exercised their right to strike.").
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the employer is held to have violated the Act because it "ha[d] not
demonstrated that it held a reasonable doubt, based on objective considerations, that the union continued to enjoy the support of a majority
of the bargaining unit employees." 139 As the Board understood its own
formulation, the employer had to actually disbelieve that the union had
maintained majority support, that disbelief had to have been based
on objective evidence, and had to have been reasonable under all the
circumstances. 140
Justice Scalia's interpretation transforms the question before the
Court into "whether, on the evidence presented to the Board, a reasonable jury could have found that Allentown lacked a genuine, reasonable
uncertainty about whether Local 724 enjoyed the continuing support
of a majority of the unit employees," 141 a question the Court immediately
answers, "No."142 In addtion, the Part III majority explicitly interprets
its rewritten standard not to require disavowals of the union by half
or more of the employees. 143
In particular, the Court weighed quite differently from the Administrative Law Judge and the Board the representations made to the employer by two employees, one of them a former union shop steward,
of not only their own dissatisfaction with the union, but that of their
co-workers. The majority concluded that as a matter oflaw, a sufficient
basis existed to establish "uncertainty whether a majority in favor of
the union existed," that is, in the majority's translation, the employer
had an objective basis to support a good faith doubt of continued majority
status. 144
This portion of the opinion is troublesome in several respects. In the
first place, however appropriate Justice Scalia's literal interpretation
approach to rules that are the product oflegislative or regulatory formulation, it seems misplaced when applied to adjudicatorily developed
139. Id. at 823 (citing 316 N.L.R.B. at 1199).
140. See Transcript of Oral Argument in Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB,
1997 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 45, *26 ("The board's standard means the employer must have
a solid, reasonable basis for believing that the union has lost majority support. The board
is not using the term doubt here to mean uncertainty. It is using that term to mean
disbelieO; id. at *27 (Mr. Chief Justice, the term doubt does have two different meanings.
One of them means vague uncertainty, and that is the way in which we use it in the
criminal law context. I think the board has been quite clear that that's not what it means
when it uses the term. Here, doubt means disbelief, and what the employer has to show
is a solid basis for believing.").
141. 118 S. Ct. at 823.
142. /d. at 823-24. The dissent shines a brilliant spotlight on this sleight of hand.
See id. at 834 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. "The Board did not specify how many express disavowals would have been
enough to establish reasonable doubt, but the number must presumably be less than 16
(half ofthe bargaining unit), since that would establish reasonable certainty." /d. at 824.
144. /d. at 825. This evidentiary conclusion is also intertwined with the majority's
redefinition of "objective evidence" discussed infra text accompanying notes 146-169,
178.
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standards. The portion of the decision advocating deference to reasonable agency interpretation of the statute it is charged to administer
(Part II) is in considerable tension with the highly non-deferential, formalistic analysis of the objectively based, good faith reasonable doubt
standard in the subsequent part (Part III) of the opinion. Justice Breyer
characterizes the second half of Justice Scalia's opinion baldly: "It has
rewritten a Board rule without adequate justification. . . . The only
authority cited for the transformation [is] the dictionary." 145
Second, based on what the Court does, rather than what it says it
does, it is as if the different majority in Parts III and IV of the decision
overrules or at least saps of all vitality the reasoning of the majority
in Part II. The formulation adopted by the majority in Part III is operationally a much weaker standard than that expressed and applied by
the Board, supposedly accepted by the Court in Part II. In addition, the
Part III and IV majority's rewriting of the NLRB "objective reasonable
doubt" standard may render it functionally indistinguishable from the
more relaxed standard of the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, firmly
rejected by the majority in Part II.
The employer's argument urging adoption of the Circuit Courts'
alternative standard was rejected by the Board and Court of Appeals
in Allentown Mack, and ostensibly was rejected by a majority of the
Court in Part II of Justice Scalia's opinion on behalf of the opposite
line-up of Justices to those signing on to this later segment of the opinion. Nevertheless, whether it is harder for an employer to demonstrate
that it "lacked a genuine, reasonable uncertainty about whether [the
union] enjoyed the continuing support of a majority of unit employees"146 (the Allentown Mack majority's rewritten version of the NLRB
standard) as compared to showing that it had "substantial, objective
evidence of a loss of union support" (the Fifth/Sixth/Ninth Circuit standard rejected by the Board and ostensibly the Court in Allentown Mack)
is highly questionable. The answer depends on what evidence counts
as "substantial" and "objective," 147 as well as on whether "uncertainty"
as to a union majority means a greater, smaller, or equivalent decline
in union adherents compared to "loss of union support." What seems
clear is that Courts of Appeals may now revisit NLRB fact-finding,
applying a facially unchanged standard of" objective reasonable doubt,"
whenever in the judges' view the employer had a "genuine, reasonable
uncertainty" about the union's continuing majority status. It is difficult
to reconcile this test with Part II' s adoption by the Court of the existing
Board formula, as well as its proclamation of continued deference to
the Board's non-arbitrary elaboration of such interpretations of the Act.
145. ld. at 833, 834 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. ld. at 823.
147. For the Allentown Mack Part ill and IV majority's loose definition of"objective,"
see infra text accompanying note 147.
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Whatever this reinterpreted standard of good faith doubt of majority
support means, it may well be applied to all three areas to which the
Board has heretofore traditionally applied the "objective reasonable
doubt" standard. The employer's threshold appears by this decision to
have been lowered not only as to polling, but also as to the filing of an
RM petition, and as to unilateral withdrawal of recognition from an
incumbent union. Both on the merits and on the Court's peculiar and
uneven approach to deference to agency interpretation of the statute
it is charged to administer, the decision is highly significant.

C. The "Objective" Nature of Three Key Pieces of Evidence
That is not, however, the end of the matter. Justice Scalia's reasoning about proper assessment of the evidence appears to overturn a good
bit of additional NLRB precedent. Allentown Mack may presage a hostile judicial attitude toward long-standing Board rules about evaluating
evidence regarding employee attitudes, sentiments, or reactions, in contexts other than determining union majority status. The majority's
"genuine reasonable uncertainty" version is based on more than simple
replacement of "honest disbelief'' in interpreting "good faith doubt." 148
"Objective evidence" is also effectively reevaluated by the Court, again
with the dictionary as virtually the only source cited in support, to
mean "evidence external to the employer's own (subjective) impressions."149 The idea that the evidence should be minimally subject to
employer taint or manipulation, implicit in the NLRB's several pertinent lines of precedent about evaluating and weighting indirect evidence of employees' union sentiments, is thereby sucked out of the
phrase without debate on the merits.
A review of the pertinent evidence is in order. To support its entitlement to poll, the employer pointed to comments by seven bargaining
unit members, during pre-hire interviews, individually disavowing support for the union. 150 On the ALJ's accounting, express disavowals of
148. See id. at 823.
149. Responding to Justice Breyer's dissent, the majority defmes "objective" in a
footnote: "[T]he meaning of the word has nothing to do with the force, as opposed to
the source, of the considerations supporting the employer's doubt .... Requiring the
employer's doubt to be based on 'objective' considerations reinforces the requirement
that the doubt be 'reasonable,' imposing on the employer the burden of showing that it
was supported by evidence external to the employer's own (subjective) impressions." !d.
at 823 n.2 (emphasis added) (citing WEBSTER's NEw INrERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1679 (2d
ed. 1949)).
150. Compare id. at 821 (contention that eight employees had expressed anti·union
sentiment) with 83 F.3d at 1487·88 (accepting the Board's contention that only seven
out ofthirty.two bargaining unit employees as of the date the employer announced the
poll had expressed anti-union sentiment to management) and 118 S. Ct. at 835 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the ALJ's decision as identifying
only six or seven employees with suitable statements, explaining the differences in compu·
tation). The employer originally also attempted to rely on statements of employees hired
subsequent to the date of announcement of its plan to conduct the poll, but the Board
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the union by "7 of 32, or roughly 20 percent of the involved employees"
was insufficient to support the employer's claim of good faith doubt. 151
The Allentown Mack Parts III and IV majority opinion first notes that
a sufficient number of employee disavowals of the union "must presumably be less than 16 (half of the bargaining unit), since that would
establish reasonable certainty. 152 Next, the majority concedes, "we
would not say that 20% first-hand confirmed opposition (even with no
countering evidence of union support) is alone enough to require a conclusion of reasonable doubt." 153 Additional evidence of the union sentiments of the remainder of the unit must therefore decide the outcome.
Allentown Mack had cited three additional, critical pieces of evidence: (1) a statement by a mechanic working on the night shift who
claimed that no one on that shift's complement of five or six workers
supported the union; (2) one employee's statement expressing dissatisfaction with the representation afforded him by the union; and (3) a
statement by one of the union's shop stewards that the employees did
not want the union, and that if an election were held, the union would
lose. 154
The Supreme Court differed sharply with the lower tribunal in
evaluating these three pieces of evidence. The ALJ, the Board, and
the Court of Appeals had applied three or perhaps four lines ofNLRB
case law discrediting the evidentiary value of specific types of employee statements other than express disavowals of support for the
union, when relied on by the employer as "objective" evidence to
support a claim of good faith doubt of union majority status. They
therefore placed little or no weight on any of the three additional
employee statements, and found the evidence insufficient to support
the employer's claimed good faith doubt. The difference in treatment
of this evidence by the Supreme Court majority may be every bit as
significant an outcome of Allentown Mack as the Court's reconstrucheld that the objective, reasonable doubt had to be determined as of the date of the decision
to conduct the poll, hence disregarded those other employee's alleged attestation of non-

support for the union. 316 N.L.R.B. at 1206-07. The Court does not comment on the
propriety of this well established Board precedent.
151. 316 N.L.R.B. at 1207, quoted in Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 824.
152. 118 S. Ct. at 824 (emphasis added). This proposition, of course, is premised on
the earlier holding interpreting "reasonable doubt" to mean "reasonable uncertainty"
rather than actual and reasonable disbelief in the union's majority support. See supra
text accompanying notes 132-139.
153. I d. (emphasis added). The rather remarkable negative implication of that sentence might be understood to mean that conilruled, flrst hand evidence of opposition to
the union on the part of 20 per cent of the bargaining unit could suffice to support a
Board decision permitting the employer to unilaterally poll, or even withdraw recognition.
Absent the one year election bar, this theory would allow the great majority of employers
whose employees have just, by majority vote, chosen union representation, to withdraw
recognition and refuse to bargain, since the union rarely wins 80 per cent of the vote in
modern Board-conducted elections.
154. 118 S. Ct. at 821.
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tion of the Board's objective, reasonable doubt standard, replacing
affirmative "disbelier' with mere "uncertainty."
In the first line of precedents, in the Court's words, "the Board has
consistently questioned the reliability of reports by one employee ofthe
antipathy of other employees toward their union. " 155 In fact, the weight
the Board gives to second or third hand testimony about other employees' sentiments depends on the extent to which the witness can provide
details about the direct and intermediate sources of the information,
the circumstances under which it was gathered, and other assurances
of its reliability and accuracy. The second body of Board precedent
"holds that an employee's statement of dissatisfaction with the quality
of union representation may not be treated as opposition to union representation."156 The third line of"Board precedent holds that an employer
may not rely on an employee's anti-union sentiments, expressed during
a job interview in which the employer has indicated that there will be
no union. Such employee expressions are unlikely to be sincere." 157
The Supreme Court treats the three pieces of evidence, and the
three related bodies ofNLRB precedent, in two different portions of the
opinion. In Part ill, the Court in effect evaluates the testimony about
each of the three employee statements as though the NLRB precedents
regarding their weight and credibility did not exist. The Court treats
as the only issue the question of whether the employer, presented with
such employee statements, could reasonably and in good faith doubt
the union's majority status. The notion of objectiveness ofthe evidence,
in the sense that the evidence be of a sort that an outside, neutral
observer would believe reliable, uninfluenced by the employer's own,
expressed or unexpressed desire that the union majority disappear, has
vanished from the analysis. Naturally, the Court finds the evidence
sufficient to support the employer's right to conduct the poll. 158
The ALJ evaluated the words of the employee who expressed dissatisfaction with his union representation as "more an expression of a
desire for better representation than one for no representation at all." 159
The Court, noting the ambiguity, assesses the statement as creditable
toward establishing the employer's good faith doubt: "the statement
would assuredly engender an uncertainty whether the speaker supported the union, and so could not be entirely ignored." 160
Hearsay testimony by an Allentown Mack manager, attributing to
one night shift employee the assertion that "the entire night shift did
155.
and two
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

I d. at 829 (quoting Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1488, citing three NLRB decisions
Court of Appeals precedents dating back as far as 1978).
I d. (quoting Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1488).
ld. (quoting Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1488).
See id. at 825.
316 N.L.R.B. at 1207, quoted in Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 824.
118 S. Ct. at 824.
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not want the union," was disregarded by the lower tribunals. 161 The
Supreme Court majority acknowledged that "[u]nsubstantiated assertions that other employees do not support the union certainly do not
establish the fact of that disfavor with the degree of reliability ordinarily
demanded in legal proceedings." 162 The Court, however, reasoned that
it is not the fact of employee disaffection from the union that is at issue,
"but rather the existence of a reasonable uncertainty on the part of the
employer regarding that fact. " 163 Similarly, while there was no evidence
of any factual foundation for the union steward's "feeling that the employees did not want a union," and that the union would lose a vote,
if one were taken, 164 the majority deemed it surely a contributing factor
"to a reasonable uncertainty whether a majority in favor of the union
existed.... Allentown would reasonably have given great credence to
Mohr's assertion of lack of union support since he was not hostile to
the union, and was in a good position to assess anti-union sentiment." 165
Nearly all of the statements were made either in the context of
a potential successor employer drawn from incumbent management
deciding whether to buy the plant and save some of the employees'
jobs or, shortly thereafter, in the course of interviews by the successor
employer, hiring employees who were well aware of the employer's
desire to operate without a union. This fact plays no role in the Court's
analysis. It has no bearing on the "objectivity" of the evidence, in so
far as real employees, external to the employer's imagination, actually
did make the statements attributed to them. However, if "objectivity"
has something to do with the quality of the evidence, and if"objectivity"
connotes an unbiased, accurate ascertainment of what the employees
really wanted, rather than what they thought the successor employer
wanted to hear, one would have to regard every bit of the evidence as
too tainted to be relied upon. 166 The Board's position did not go nearly
this far, occupying a middle ground in weighting evidence of doubtful
reliability.
Nor did the Court majority deem it significant that the two most
important pieces of evidence were testified to before the ALJ by members of management rather than the employees quoted as having made
the statements. Managerial witnesses testified about night shift worker
Bloch's statement about the night shift workers' wish to leave the union,
161. ld. at 821.
162. Id. at 824.
163. Id.
164. 316 N.L.R.B. at 1207-08.
165. 118 S. Ct. at 825.
166. The extreme position rejecting employee statements made under such inherently
coercive conditions as invariably unreliable, on the other hand, might tend to disenfranchise the voice of workers unhappy with union representation, even when a solid majority,
or even supermajority wished to be rid of the union entirely apart from the hiring or
successorship context in which the statements were made.
·
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as well as about the statement about widespread employee disaffection
with the union, attributed to Mohr, the union steward. Precisely because
this was second-hand testimony, no details were provided which might
have permitted an assessment of the accuracy and reliability of the
circumstances under which the intermediary employees, quoted as to
their understanding of the group sentiment, gathered their information.167 In so far as the issue was the truth of the underlying matter,
the real views of the employees, this was third hand, not even second
hand testimony. Worse still, the evidence was based on testimony by
a member of management, whose employment position creates an antiunion self-interest susceptible of influencing the witness' recollection
of the wording of statements about employees' union sentiments. 168
To the Court, however, the NLRB's routine application of its precedents limiting the value of each of the three pieces of indirect evidence
was a "refusal to credit probative circumstantial evidence." 169 The majority opinion gives some weight to the equivocal statement of the employee who was dissatisfied with the representation he was getting in
return for his union dues, 170 concludes that the statement by the employee that his night shift co-workers did not want the union should
"be given considerable weight," 171 and that the union steward's statement to the effect that the employees, if given the chance, would vote
out the union, "has undeniable and substantial probative value on the
issue of 'reasonable doubt.' " 172
Finally, the majority presented its mathematical analysis of this
situation: since seven employees expressly disavowed support for the
union, the other "25 would have had to support the union by a margin
of 17 to 8-a ratio of more than 2 to 1" for the union to have maintained
majority status. 173 The night shift employees' disaffection and the steward's statement, the Court reasons, "would cause anyone to doubt that
167. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 1199, 1200, 1207-08. See
also Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1488.
168. At least some of the Administrative Law Judges applying the NLRA, however,
seem to have avoided following Allentown Mack to its logical conclusion. See, e.g.,
Transpersonnel, Inc., 1998 NLRB LEXIS 316, at *32-34 (May 27, 1998), distinguishing
Allentown Mack and declining to credit manager's testimony quoting employee as to
co-workers' disaffection with the union, where manager was well aware employee was
a non·member, long opposed to the union, and where manager had induced employee's
further statements).
169. Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 824.
170. Id. ("The statement would assuredly engender an uncertainty whether the
speaker supported the union, and so could not be entirely ignored.").
171. I d. (As to the Allentown manager's testimony regarding his recollection of what
Bloch, the night shift worker, said to the manager about disaffection for the union among
the night shift employees, the Court held, "absent some reason for the employer to know
that Block had no basis for his information, or that Block was lying, reason demands
that the statement be given considerable weight.").
172. ld. at 825.
173. Id.
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degree of support ... " 174 The Court concludes that "giving fair weight
to Allentown's circumstantial evidence, we think it quite impossible
for a rational factfinder to avoid the conclusion that Allentown has
reasonable, good faith grounds to doubt-to be uncertain about-the
union's retention of majority support." 176
As the majority accuses the ALJ, NLRB, and Court of Appeals either
of not "giving fair weight to Allentown's circumstantial evidence" or
of not being "rational" in their fact-finding, or both, one should pause
to unpack the Court's own arithmetic. First, the Court is characterizing
as "circumstantial evidence" of the real union sentiments of the employees something not usually accorded that label-third hand evidence,
based on second hand statements, with no explicit testimony about the
first hand statements of the employees whose views are in issue. Second,
the statement by the one employee who was not sure he was getting
his dues money's worth in union representation could perhaps be labeled
circumstantial evidence of the employee's own union sentiments. It is,
however, hard to label arbitrary or irrational the interpretation of the
NLRB that standing alone, statements of dissatisfaction with the quality of an incumbent union's representation are not probative of a desire
to get rid of the union, rather than change its leadership or practices.
Were there additional information suggesting the employee's desire to
work without a union, one could treat the at-most ambiguous statement
as corroborative or probative of that individual employee's desires about
union representation.
The Allentown Mack Part ill and IV majority is largely composed of
those members of the Court-the Chief Justice, and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Scalia-who have been extremely reluctant to interpret
stray remarks, statements by managers not directly involved in the
employment decisionmaking process, or other forms of indirect as well
as circumstantial evidence, as probative of the employer's unlawful
motive under Title Vll in making a particular employment decision. 176
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the members of the Allentown
Mack Part ill and IV majority apply a double standard in their assessment of second hand testimony, off-handed comments, and indirect expressions of union sentiment.
Arithmetically, the Court's reasoning here is dubious as well. Whenever the union's majority is less than unanimous, if one presents infor174. ld.
175. ld.
176. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[S]tray remarks in the workplace ... cannot justify requiring the employer
to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. Nor
can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the
decisional process itself, suffice"); id. at 280 (dissenting opinion of Kennedy, J., Rehnquist,
C.J., and Scalia, J.) (shifting burden of persuasion as to employer's motives "not for every
case in which plaintiff produces evidence of stray remarks in the workplace").
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mation only about the employees opposed to the union, a super-majority
will be required for the union to have overall majority support among
the bargaining unit. The Court's approach effectively eliminates the
continuing presumption of majority support, not after considering all
the evidence, but after considering the evidence that 20 percent of the
employees expressly disavowed the union to the employer, mainly during job interviews. 177 Yet the Court earlier concluded that 20 percent
was too low a number, on its own, to dictate a reasonable doubt, much
less the actual conclusion that the union had lost its majority. 178
D. Administrative Law and Three Lines of NLRB Precedent
Regarding the Reliability of Evidence of Employees' Support
for the Union
Having concluded that on its own view of the evidence, examined
without consideration of the Board's rules for weighting it, it would
have been impossible for a rational fact finder not to find that the employer had satisfied the Board's polling standard, the majority had already implicitly suggested that the three lines of Board precedent as
to treatment of evidence were no longer viable. In the fourth and final
section of the opinion, however, the Court went much further. It explicitly declared it to be error for the ALJ and the Board to rely on any of
these lines of authority, rather than ad hoc "logic and sound inference
from all the circumstances" in assessing evidence of good faith reasonable doubt, or presumably anything else. 179 Accusing the Board of systematically using words and phrases to mean something other than
what is stated, both in connection with the polling standard and otherwise, the Court held that this had to stop. 180 Henceforth, it instructed,
reviewing courts would examine stated NLRB standards as verbally
expressed, and apply ordinary evidentiary rules to examine the record
for support of the NLRB's findings of fact to support their conclusions. 181
The reasoning of the majority opinion in Parts III and IV appears
to be constructed to obscure inferential gaps by conflating what were,
in the original Board standard, two separate criteria the employer had
to meet: (1) the employer had to actually possess a real, good faith doubt
of the union's majority status based on actual evidence and not mere
wishful thinking; and (2) the nature of that supporting evidence had
to be not only external from the employer's imagination, but to a reasonable degree, of a sort that an objective observer would see as sufficiently
verifiable, accurate, and reliable to support such a judgment if, say, it
were in opposition to the employer's wishes. The second criteria was
expressed through the separate lines of NLRB precedent addressing
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 824.
Id.
ld. at 829.
ld. at 826-28.
Id. at 828-29.
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evidentiary issues, but nevertheless, was an implicit part of the formulation of the polling standard. By effectively judicially overruling these
criteria, without squarely addressing them on their merits, the Court
does exactly what it disavows in Part II of its the opinion: substitutes
its judgment for the Board's expertise in matters vouchsafed to the
Board by Congress. Ironically, the majority's approach closely resembles that of the Board the Court heavily criticizes as disingenuous, if
not deliberately misleading.
The Court construed the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to
apply to the NLRB's adjudicatorily developed rules, including in particular these rules about the treatment of evidence, and then in effect
construed the requirement that agency rules not be arbitrary to require
that they conform to plain English (perhaps for lawyers) definitions.
This was necessary both to ensure proper judicial review, the Court
suggested/ 82 and to meet administrative due process provisions embedded in the APA, requiring a "scheme of 'reasoned decisionmaking.' " 183
To comply with the APA, Justice Scalia wrote, the agency's action not
only "must be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process
by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational." 184
Courts set aside notice and comment regulations if not adequately
supported by the reasons advanced by the agency, even if the rule would
be within the agency's scope of authority. Where used like it is by the
NLRB, the Court held, agency adjudication must be subjected to the
same requirement. "It is hard to imagine a more violent breach of [the
reasoned decision making] requirement than applying a rule of primary
conduct or a standard of proof which is in fact different from the rule or
standard formally announced.'' 185 Moreover, the Court reasoned, "[a]n
agency should not be able to impede judicial review, and indeed even
political oversight, by disguising its policymaking as factfinding," 186
a thinly-veiled contention that this was exactly what the Board had
intended to accomplish.
Because reasoned decisionmaking demands it, and because the systemic consequences of any other approach are unacceptable, the Board
must be required to apply in fact the clearly understood legal standards
that it enunciates in principle, such as good faith reasonable doubt
and preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing courts are entitled to
take those standards to mean what they say, and to conduct substantialevidence review on that basis. Even the most consistent ... departure
from proper application of those standards will not alter the legal rule
by which the agency's factfinding is to be judged. 187
182. Id. at 828.
183. ld. at 826 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)).
184. Id.
185. ld. at 827.
186. ld. at 828.
187. Id.
HeinOnline -- 14 Lab. Law. 563 1998-1999

564

14

THE LABOR LAWYER

533 (1999)

As a result of this decision, deference to the agency's construction
of its own statutory interpretations could be held to be inappropriate
whenever the interpretation does not comply with ordinary legal or
standard language usage. This is a rather dramatic shift away from
cases like Chevron 188 and A uer v. Robbins, 189 counseling great deference
to agency interpretations, formal or informal, of the statutes they administer and the regulations they have promulgated thereunder. In the
space of two years, the Court has moved quite a distance from Justice
Scalia's opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that it must sustain the
Secretary of Labor's informal construction of its salary-basis executive,
administrative, and professional exemption test under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, so long as the Secretary's approach is "based on a permissible construction of the statute," where Congress has not "directly
spoken to the precise question at issue." 190 While the Allentown Mack
Court was clearly irate at what it perceived to be perverse administrative adjudicatory practices by the NLRB, 191 the holding here is likely
to trouble many other agencies as well.
The result will surely produce problems for the Board extending
beyond the polling issue, or even the objective, reasonable doubt issue
in connection with withdrawals of recognition, refusals to bargain, and
filing of RM petitions. 192 While one may differ with the Court or the
employer in its insinuations about the illegitimacy of the Board's mode
of delineating adjudicatory rules governing virtually all aspects of
NLRB practice, it is certainly true that to those not among the cognoscenti, NLRB decisions often use terminology that seems impenetrable.
Political differences aside, and without regard to which political party
188. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
189. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
190. Id. at 457 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
191. "Reasoned decision making, in which the rule announced is the rule applied,
promotes sound results, and unreasoned decision making the opposite. The evil of a
decision that applies a standard other than the one it enumerates spreads in both directions, preventing both consistent application of the law by subordinate agency personnel
(notably administrative law judges), and effective review of the law by the courts ....
(A] series of cases that exemplify in practice the divorcing of the rule announced from
the rule applied ... frustrates judicial review. If revision of the Board's standard of proof
can be achieved thus subtly and obliquely, it becomes a much more complicated enterprise
for a court of appeals to determine whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion
that the required standard has or has not been met." 118 S. Ct. at 812-28.
192. The decision almost immediately began consequences in these directly affected
areas. See, e.g., Pirelli Cable Corp. v. NLRB,141 F.3d503, 519-21(4th Cir. 1998)(rejecting
§ NLRB 8(aX5) finding where employer withdrew recognition and refused to bargain
after employees submitted decertification petition that court concluded was untainted
by unfair labor practices, because following Allentown Mack reasoning, it had already
rejected other NLRB factfinding and overturned ruling that strike had been caused by
employer unfair labor practices, rendering employer's unilateral changes based on implementation of its last offer lawful); Alcon Fabricators, Div'n of Alcon Indus., 1998 NLRB
LEXIS 411 (1998) (following Allentown Mack, crediting secondhand testimony regarding
employee sentiment and upholding employer withdrawal of recognition).
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dominated the Board in a given period of time, the case law has consistently relied on a high level of jargon, insider terminology and eccentric
usage. The rigid use of highly specialized, often atypical usage-based
terminology in its decision making, however, has been ameliorated by
the consistency of the usage, in the sense that NLRB officials and employer and union representatives who were frequent participants in
NLRB processes understood the usage, and the NLRB internal hierarchy remained faithful to the substance of the precedents because ofthe
strong constraints imposed by the terminology.
The Allentown Mack decision will encourage litigants to challenge
many bodies of NLRB precedent that they may find inconvenient in a
given case, on review in the Courts of Appeals. 193 This may help ensure
full employment for labor lawyers, but it is unlikely to result in an
improvement in the administration of the NLRA or effectuation of the
policies of the Act.
The Court's criticism may be valid to the extent that outsiders,
especially the courts and Congress, have additional hurdles to overcome
to accurately assess NLRB rulings, but the Court's construction of the
APA as applying to require more transparent usage by the Board seems
highly questionable. It is not clear that the adversarial judicial review
system is incapable of remedying any confusion on the part of reviewing
courts. Parties before the Board rarely claim that they have been misled
or confused by the Board's obscure usage of terminology and pyramiding
of precedents to construct fully integrated rules on particular topics.
The employer in Allentown Mack did not claim that it had in any
way misunderstood the Board's standards, or that it had in fact acted
in reliance on the standards governing polling, as formally stated,
rather than on the basis of a full review of the applicable doctrine and
advice of counsel competently revealing the evidentiary precedents as
well as the objective, good faith doubt test. Such a contention would
verge on an admission of legal malpractice by counsel.
Rather, the employer wanted the Board to be bound by the policy
stated in the express standard, read without integrating the evidentiary
policies stated in other precedents, if it could not get the standard itself
overturned. Whether the employer's argument represented sound policy under the NLRA, it is hard to see why the APA should affect the
analysis, except to constrain the Court from doing exactly what it did:
second-guessing the Board's standards, in areas left open under the Act,

193. See, e.g., Mid-America Care Foundation v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638,642-43 (6th Cir.
1998) (rejecting the NLRB interpretation of the § 2(11) phrase "independent judgment"
regarding the supervisory status of LPN charge nurses, on grounds, inter alia, that "[a]s
in Allentown Mack, here the NLRB has divorced the rule announced from the rule applied"
as well as that there was not "substantial evidence" to support the NLRB application
of the rule).
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and falling well within the Board's special expertise and authority to
administer the law.
The Court also accuses the Board of being obscure for the purpose
of misdirecting congressional oversight and confusing the political process. This is not, as far as my reading of the APA reveals, covered under
the statutory concerns, unlike administrative due process for litigants
and reasonable transparency for reviewing courts. 194 Congress is fully
capable of vindicating its own interests through the legislative and
appropriations process, if it shares the Court's perception. The Court's
devotion to the statutory text may have suffered a momentary lapse
here.
The Board is, as the Court itself noted in Allentown Mack, free to
modify or restate its existing precedents in the form of rules that more
accurately express the substance of the standard. Such a restatement
of principles would be responsive to the Allentown majority's criticism
and would impose less of a burden on the practitioner to master multiple
lines of Board case law and integrate them to discern the entirety of
the Board's approach to the area in question. Construing the APA to
require the regulatory agency to perform the integrative legal work,
rather than the legal practitioner, however, seems itself to lack mooring
in the statutory text. Such a requirement has more in common with
continental European civil law methods and evidences a departure from
the traditional common law interpretative approach.
The General Counsel has already urged the Board to reconsider its
objective, good faith doubt standard, proposing in a pending case that
the employer's unilateral withdrawal of recognition be flatly forbidden,
but that either Board-conducted elections or employer polling be allowed on a showing of direct evidence of actual loss of union support
among at least 30 percent of the unit, together with objective evidence
providing the employer with "reasonable grounds for believing that
194. 5 U .S.C. § 553 provides for notice and public comment in the course of administrative agency rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 sets forth notice and due process requirements applicable to agency adjudicatory proceedings, including notice to litigants of the
allegations and a fair opportunity to contest them, including the right to be represented by
counsel, to present evidence and legal argument, to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses, that the agency official presiding over the hearing be impartial and not have
participated in a prosecutorial capacity in the same or related matter, and that the agency
render a written decision if the matter is not settled. Rulings both on the main and on
collateral matters must be accompanied by a statement of the grounds for the decision.
Findings of fact and conclusions of law must be expressed in writing in the initial or
recommended decision, if any, as well as in the agency's final adjudicatory decision. 5
U.S.C. §§ 701-706 provide for judicial review of agency adjudication. While 5 U.S.C.
§ § 801-808 contains special provisions regarding congressional oversight of agency rulemaking, there is no provision for oversight of adjudicatory actions, apart from the general
legislative oversight process. Legislative oversight of administrative adjudicatory decisions would implicate significant separation of powers issues.
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the union has lost its majority." 195 The Courts will have to examine any
change in prevailing Board rules for consistency with the Act. However,
whether this or some other rule is adopted by the Board, it is likely
that the holding in Allentown will lead to some form of modification
by the Board of its rules, since the version reconstructed by the Court
certainly expresses a far different policy for polling than any ever
adopted by the Board.
The larger problem for the Board is its long history of proceeding
by adjudication rather than formal rulemaking proceedings. There is
a large web of common law-like interpretation of the Act, which is construed in a quasi-common law-like method, and it is difficult to envision
the Board thoroughly overhauling its large corpus of precedent, whether
through formal rulemaking or a rejuvenated adjudicatory process in
which the Board members focus on framing their holdings in a rule-like
fashion.
The Board's method of developing rules through adjudication, and
the attendant indeterminacy and uncertainty, are neither unique to it
as a regulatory agency nor substantially different from the interpretative methods employed by American courts. If the Board's methods
fail the Allentown Mack critique of adjudicatory interpretation, similar
criticism could be levelled at the courts themselves. Like the Board,
courts interpret statutes such as, for example, Title VII through common
law jurisprudential methods, based on accumulated judicial precedents,
integrated, reconciled, and made mutually consistent with each other
and the statutory text. Moreover, Congressionally-enacted statutes
would seem to often run afoul of Allentown Mack's insistence that words
speak clearly and employ their plain English. One cannot help doubting,
for example, whether the disparate impact provisions of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act to
incorporate Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 196 and its progeny, incorporating
statutory textual language partially inconsistent with Griggs or one
or more of its progeny, would pass Justice Scalia's stringent test for
compliance with the requirements of reasoned decision making and
transparency for judicial review.
Given the Justices' repeated references to the dictionary as primary
interpretative authority, not only in this case but in several others this
195. See NLRB Acting General Counsel Fred Feinstein's Report on Cases Decided
fromMarch31, 1996, toJune30, 1998, 172DailyLab.Rep.(BNA)E-4(September4, 1998).
See also Susan J. McGolrick, Federal Agencies, 06 Daily Lab Rep (BNA) S-5 (January
11, 1999) (NLRB has under submission Chelsea Indus., Inc. (7-CA-368465) and Levitz
Furniture Co. of the Pacific, Inc. (20-CA-26596), in which it is considering General Counsel
Feinstein's proposed changes in Board practice); NLRB's Notice and Invitation to File
Briefs in Chelsea Indus., Inc. and Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, Inc., 1998 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) 71 at D26 (April 14, 1998).
196. 401 u.s. 424 (1971).
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term, 197 the NLRB may not be the only administrative tribunal under
pressure to change its habits. 198 Furthermore, one could question
whether the Court itself practices the strict, formal construction that
it preaches. One rather obvious example is the interpretation of Title
VII this term to impose liability on employers for their supervisors'
sexual harassment of subordinates, subject to a judicially crafted affirmative defense. 199 While this holding in Ellerth 200 and Faraghe~ 01 may
faithfully reflect the purposes of the statute, it is the antithesis ofliteralistic, statutory textual analysis. 202
At bottom, it is the very method of common law adjudicatory interpretation of statutes, with its indeterminacy and shifting details of construction, to which Justice Scalia seems to object. He obliquely accepts
the Supreme Court precedent abjuring any requirement that the Board
develop its rules through rulemaking rather than the adjudicatory process.203 The gist of the holding announced in Allentown Mack, however,
seems to require that the Board interpret its statute in a fashion more
like an agency rule making process, and less like a common law court. 204
This result, too, seems hard to find explicitly, or even implicitly in the
text of the APA. Perhaps the Court's interpretative method in this
portion of the opinion suffers from a flaw similar to that of which the
majority accuses the Board.
197. The other two labor and employment law cases include Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div'n, Avco Corp. v. United Auto Workers, 118 S. Ct. 1626, 1629 (1998);
and Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1998). All three majority opinions were
authored by Justice Scalia. In two non-employment ADA cases, producing decisions that
have a bearing on ADA employment litigation, Justices also relied upon the dictionary
as authority: Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2215 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia,
and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); and Pennsylvania v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1955 (1998)(Scalia, J.). In addition, the dictionary was
cited in at least one opinion in the following three cases last term: Clinton v. City of
New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2098 n.13 (1998) (Stevens, J.); National Endowment v. Finley,
118 S. Ct. 2168, 2180-81 (1998) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment); and
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures TV, Inc., 118 S. Ct.1279, 1288 (1998)(Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
198. See, e.g., Biddulph v. Callahan, 1 F. Supp. 2d 12, 21 (D.D.C. 1998) (following
Allentown Mack to hold that Social Security Administration determination of facts was
lacking requisite support of "substantial evidence" based on how a reasonable factfinder,
rather than an eccentric agency, would interpret the evidence).
199. See generally Weiss, supra note 9.
200. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
201. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
202. The dissent in Ellerth rather accurately labels the affirmative defense "a piece
of judicial legislation." 118 S. Ct. at 2271.
203. See id. 118 S. Ct. at 827 ("The National Labor Relations Board, uniquely among
major federal administrative agencies, has chosen to promulgate virtually all the legal
rules in its field through adjudication rather than rulemaking") (citing NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974). Bell Aerospace holds, inter alia, that "the
choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance in the Board's
discretion." 416 U.S. at 294.
204. See id. at 827 (purporting to apply similar standards to judicial review ofNLRB
policy, whether developed through the rulemaking or the adjudicatory process).
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V. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel
Another noteworthy decision is Eastern Enterprises v. Apfef05 in
which the Court split four-one-four over whether a provision of the Coal
Industry Retiree Health Benefits Act of 1992 206 violated either the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Due Process clause. The
challenged section of the statute imposed liability on the plaintiff employer for the funding of a portion of the health care benefits of coal
miners who had worked for the company many years earlier. 207 The
fact that this employer had left the industry in 1965 played a major
role in persuading the four member plurality, in an opinion written by
Justice O'Connor, that the legislation was severely retroactive, hence
unconstitutional. 208
In the plurality's analysis, the disruption of settled expectations
rendered the imposition of a legal duty to contribute to the statutorilycreated fund a taking of the assets of the employer, still operating in
other business fields. 209 As the plurality viewed it, Congress in essence
imposed a duty to fund the equivalent of a defined benefit plan, despite
the fact that the employer, at the time it left the industry, was only
funding a defined contribution plan that limited benefits payable to
those benefits fundable based on then-existing contributions. 210 The substantiality of the financial burden imposed on the employer, and its
disproportionality to the employer's funding obligations when active
in the industry under its own plan, were also key factors in the holding.
The law was therefore deemed to "attach new legal consequences to [an
employment relationship] completed before its attachment," 211 hence to
"substantially interfere with Eastern's reasonable investment expectations."212 Imposing such a retroactive burden upon Eastern, the plurality holds, would violate "fundamental principles of fairness underlying
the Takings Clause. " 213
The four dissenters, Justices Breyer, Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg, viewed the Coal Act as falling within the scope of permissible
social regulation and taxation. The dissenters were particularly influenced by their view that there had been an unwritten, perhaps
legally unenforceable but nevertheless implicit commitment on the
part of the entire coal industry, including the plaintiff former coal
205. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
206. 26 u.s.c. §§ 9701·9722 (1998).
207. 26 U.S.C. § 9706(aX3).
208. See 118 S. Ct. at 2143.
209. See id. at 2153 ("severely retroactive," "far in the past"); id. at 2152 ("The
distance into the past that the Act reaches back to impose liability ... raise[s) substantial
questions of fairness.").
210. ld. at 2152.
211. I d. at 2151 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)).
212. ld.
213. ld. at 2153.
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employer, to ensure the promised pension and health care benefits
to retired coal miners. 214
Justice Kennedy, casting the decisive vote, took an extremely careful approach to the problem. His opinion leans toward formalism in
rejecting the dissenters' contention that moral or implicit promises and
representations about miners' benefits by the industry could support
legislated imposition of such a greatly expanded liability compared to
that undertaken in writing during the period when Eastern Enterprises
had been mining coal. 215 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy viewed
the doctrinal slippery slope problem posed by an expansion of takings
doctrine as extremely dangerous, and preferred to rest his analysis on
the substantive due process violation that he perceived to ensue from
retroactive imposition of liability based on acts many years in the past.
Despite the legacy of New Deal substantive due process decisions, he
regarded the narrow and specific context of retroactive legislation as
one carrying its own historical legacy of opprobrium within the United
States and other democracies, and on that basis attempted to craft a
narrowly bounded application of substantive due process doctrine. 216
It thus seems clear that a majority of this Court will overturn social
and labor regulation if it unduly and retroactively disrupts settled employer expectations. 217 However, the lack of a majority for any given
doctrinal basis, and the fact that both bases articulated-substantive
due process and Takings Clause doctrine-are extremely malleable and
open to subjective judgment about the extent of disruption of expectation, the legitimacy of expectation, and the justification for the disruption, make predictions about future cases extremely difficult. On the
one hand, the decision appears to suggest that a majority of the Court
will resist expansive development of the Takings Clause or any other
constitutional provision to protect entrepreneurial rights against regulation in a manner reminiscent of the old substantive due process cases.
On the other hand, the sanguine reading of a bounded approach to
constitutional invalidation of economic legislation may have suffered

214. Id. at 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2165-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 2159 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
216. See id. at 2154-59 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
217. In this regard, one can view the Eastern Enterprises Court's reasoning as fitting
within the line of Takings Clause cases that overturn legal provisions "inconsistent with
the classical requirement of rules that are certain and knowable in advance." See Molly
S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92
Nw. U. L. REv. 591, 650 (1998). One may also read the decision as fitting the established
category Takings Clause cases overturning laws which unfairly single out and burden
a handful of economic actors to accomplish a social goal benefitting many, where the
actors are viewed as "no more responsible for the harm the regulation seeks to remedy,
and no more benefitted by its relief, than other individuals who bear none of its economic
costs." I d. at 652.

HeinOnline -- 14 Lab. Law. 570 1998-1999

1997-98 Court Term (Part II): NLRA, Takings Clause, and ADA

571

a major blow through the Eastern Enterprises decision, even though no
new body of doctrine commanded majority support.
Professor Molly McUsic, for example, has read the Court's Takings
Clause approach until now as one that largely confined itself to real
property-related restrictions, particularly environmental regulation,
land use limitations, and other forms of regulation burdening a handful
of property owners to benefit the entire community. 218 On her institutionally-based analysis, the Court has until now carefully skirted the
post-substantive due process body of doctrine upholding economic regulatory legislation. 219 If so, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel may constitute
an important breach in the dike, and signal a shift in direction by the
Court. In particular, the "ascendancy of dominion interests in land"
which McUsic discerns in recent Takings Clause decisions, 220 may be
at an end.
The Eastern Enterprises case does, in any event, evidence Justice
Kennedy's increasingly independent frame of mind, as well as his somewhat idiosyncratic brand of judicial conservatism. His opinion for the
majority in Bragdon v. Abbott further signals Justice Kennedy's inclination and ability to chart his own course, and in that case, he succeeded
in carrying a majority of the Court with him.
VI. "Disability" and "Direct Threat" under the ADA:
Bragdon v. Abbott
The non-employment law case this term likely to have the greatest
effect on employment law is certainly Bragdon v. Abbott,221 a case that
arose under the ADA provision addressing disability-related discrimination in the provision of public accommodations. 222 This Title III decision interprets the meaning of "impairment," "major life activities,"
and "substantially limits," which together control the meaning of the
statutory term "disability." 223 In addition, the opinion discusses appropriate methods of proving or rebutting a claim that the individual with
a disability poses a "direct threat" to the health or safety of others. 224
These are all terms with identical or similar formulations under Title
218. Seeid. at595-606(1998);MollyS. McUsic, TheGhosto{Lochner: Modern Takings
Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 608-09 (1996).
219. See McUsic, supra note 217, at 601, 607, 633-45; McUsic, supra note 218, at
608-10.
220. See McUsic, supra note 217, at 598. Prof. McUsic explains that the current Court
has "assembled nearly an equally potent arsenal of doctrinal tools" compared to the
Lochner-era Court's instruments for analyzing substantive due process; "[i]t has adopted
for the Takings Clause similar nexus requirements as the Lochner-era Court while incorporating a form of their expansive property definition. It is this combination that makes
the Takings Clause a formidable tool against liberal economic policy." Id. at 624.
221. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
222. 42 u.s.c. § 12182.
223. 118 S. Ct. at 2204.
224. Id. at 2216.
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I of the ADA. The Supreme Court's approach in Bragdon therefore
will provide important precedent for the lower courts in deciding ADA
employment cases. Bragdon also provides the lower courts with a schematic for the order in which they should analyze contested allegations
that the plaintiff meets the statutory definition of "disability."
By loosening up on important aspects of the "disability" definition, Bragdon will greatly simplify plaintiffs' overall task in typical
ADA employment cases. Until now, plaintiffs have often found themselves caught between the need to show that they are severely enough
impaired and their life activities sufficiently limited to qualify as
"disabled," while still remaining sufficiently non-impaired to be able
to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, the essential
functions of the job at issue in the litigation. 225 Defendants have successfully whipsawed plaintiffs in many cases, as the employees have
struggled to avoid being impaled on either horn of the dilemma. By
easing up on the requirements to prove disability, and especially
by permitting plaintiffs to rely on major life activities unrelated to
employment or economic gain, the Bragdon decision has made it much
easier for certain categories of disability discrimination plaintiffs to
establish claims.
A. The Majority Opinion
Plaintiff Sidney Abbott went to defendant Randon Bragdon's dental
offices for an examination. The patient disclosed her lllV-infected status, although she was then asymptomatic. When the dental examination revealed a cavity, Dr. Bragdon refused to fill it in his office. He
did offer to treat the condition at a hospital at no additional charge for
his professional services, but with the patient bearing the extra costs
for use of the hospital's facilities. 226 The district court granted summary
judgment for plaintiffs, 227 and the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that asymptomatic lllV-infected status was sufficient
to satisfy the ADA definition of "disability." 22s The lower courts also
rejected the dentist's defense that treating Abbott in Dr. Bragdon's
office would have "posed a direct threat to the health and safety of
others," a statutory defense under Title m of the ADA. 229
225. See, eg., Halperin v. Abacus Technology Corp., 128 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1997)
(employee who suffered back injury either was only temporarily impaired, hence not
sufficiently limited in major life activity to be "disabled," or not available and able to
work, hence not "qualified"); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox, 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997)
(former employee's evidence tending to show ability to perform many types of work, with
or without reasonable accommodation, held to preclude possibility of finding substantial
limitation in major life activity of work, hence employee held not to be "disabled.").
226. 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
227. 912 F. Supp. 580,585-87 (D.Me.1995). The United States and the Maine Human
Rights Commission had intervened as enforcement agency plaintiffs. Id. at 584.
228. 107 F.3d 934, 939-43 (1st Cir. 1997).
229. 912 F. Supp. at 587-91, aff'd, 107 F.3d at 943-48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3)).
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The Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, upheld the courts below in
concluding that HIV infection constitutes a "disability" as defined under
the ADA. 230 The statutory definition of "disability" is contained in the
"general provisions" of the statute, applicable identically to Title I, prohibiting discrimination in employment. 231 The construction adopted by
the Court in Bragdon is therefore binding in ADA employment cases, as
well as in public accommodations cases and other types of disabilitybased discrimination cases. In particular, the Court held plaintiff's HIV
infection satisfied the first prong of the disability definition, i.e., that it
constituted "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one of more of the major life activities of' 232 the individual claiming to
have a disability. 233 It was therefore deemed unnecessary to consider the
second prong, "a record of such an impairment,"234 or the third prong,
"being regarded as having such an impairment."235
The methodology employed by Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, in analyzing the definitional question, will undoubtedly become
hornbook law, routinely recited in ADA employment discrimination
cases as well as other types of ADA claims. While not dissimilar to
that developed in the ADA regulations and in Circuit Court decisions,
Justice Kennedy's formulation will crystallize the formula:
Our consideration of subsection (A) of the definition proceeds in three
steps. First, we consider whether respondent's HIV infection was a
physical impairment. Second, we identify the life activity upon which
respondent relies (reproduction and child bearing) and determine
whether it constitutes a major life activity under the ADA. Third, tying
the two statutory phrases together, we ask whether the impairment
substantially limited the major life activity. 236

1. Impairment
Turning to physical impairment, the Court held that "HIV infection
satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the disease." 237 This result will control the
question of impairment in future disability discrimination cases involving the AIDS virus. The Court's reasoning, moreover, takes a broad
construction of the term "impairment" which may smooth the path for
plaintiffs claiming many other types of disabilities.
The current Department of Justice regulations applicable to Bragdon as a Title Ill ADA action are virtually identical in their first two
paragraphs to the EEOC's ADA Title I employment discrimination reg230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

118 S. Ct. at 2207.
42 u.s.c. § 12102(2).
Id. § 12102(2XA).
118 S. Ct. at 2201, 2207.
42 u.s.c. § 12102(2)(B).
Id. § 12102(2XC). See 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
118 S. Ct. at 2202.
ld. at 2204.
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ulations defining "physical or mental impairment. " 238 Both were drawn
verbatim, save for minor punctuation changes, from the 1977 Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) regulations, issued to
implement the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 239 The original regulations
included a commentary containing a representative but not exhaustive
list of disorders qualifying as physical impairments under the statutes.240 In 1980, when enforcement authority for Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act was transferred to the Department of Justice, the
agency reissued the same regulations, this time incorporating the illustrative listing into the text of the definitional regulation. 241 The fact
that HIV was not identified as the cause of AIDS until after the DOJ's
regulations were issued perhaps facilitated the Court's recognition that
the absence ofHIV from the enumerated illnesses was of no significance,
since the listing was merely illustrative, and "HIV infection does fall
well within the general definition set forth by the regulations .. .''242
At least by implication, the Court construed "impairment" as encompassing all disorders that fit within the broad regulatory definition,
whether or not the condition is listed and without any need to compare
the disorder to those on the list. 243 In holding that even asymptomatic
HIV infection falls squarely within the physical impairment definition
in the regulation, the Court applied a literal reading of the provision,
which defines "impairment" as including "any physiological disorder
or condition ... affecting one or more of the following body systems:
... hemic and lymphatic .... " 244 Because HIV causes abnormalities in
the blood and lymph systems from the onset of infection, as well as
because of the severity of the effects, the Court concluded that "HIV
infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant
and detrimental effect on the infected person's hemic and lymphatic
systems from the moment of infection," hence it satisfies the definition
in the statute and regulations of a "physical impairment" throughout
the course of the disease. 245
This portion of Bragdon would appear to put to rest restrictive interpretations of "impairment" either relying on the detailed listing rather
than the general rule, or restrictively interpreting which body systems'
impairment satisfies the definition, heightening the extent of the effect
necessary to qualify as "impairment." The Court's acceptance of cellu238. Compare Department of Justice ADA Title ill Public Accommodation Regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(aX1) with EEOC ADA Title I Employment Regulations, 29 CFR
§ 1630.2(h) (1997).
239. Now codified as reissued, without amendment, by the Department of Health
and Human Services, 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i). See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2202.
240. 42 Fed. Reg. 22685 (1977), codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, p. 334 (1997),
discussed in Bradgon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202.
241. See 118 S. Ct. at 2203 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1)).
242. ld. at 2202-03.
243. See id.
244. ld. at 2202 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i).
245. ld. at 2204.
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lar and biochemical changes as sufficient, despite the lack of symptomatic consequences, will strongly militate in favor of finding impairment
in other types of cases in which the patient suffers from a disorder that
plainly "affects" a bodily system, and in fact causes physical symptoms
albeit not as severe as those some courts have until now deemed necessary. Even more important, however, than the Court's interpretation
of"impairment" is the majority's broad construction of"major life activity," as well as its interpretation of what relation between impairment
and major life activity constitutes the requisite "substantial limitation"
of the individual's activity sufficient to qualify as disabled.
2. Major Life Activity
The Court accepted the case at bar as having been litigated and
presented for certiorari as though the only major life activity limited
by the impairment was reproduction. Accordingly, the Court analyzed
the issue as though reproduction were the only potential major life
activity altered by the disease, while acknowledging that for many HIV
infected persons, many other life activities are deeply affected. 246
Rejecting the defendant's argument that major life activities include
only "aspects of a person's life which have a public, economic, or daily
character," and carefully construing the regulatory definition listing
"functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working," as
"illustrative, not exhaustive," the Court found no basis in the text of
either statute or regulations to infer such a limitation. 247 Because the
listing of functions such as "caring for oneself, ... and performing manual tasks" in fact cuts against any requirement of economic or public
character, the Court held that reproduction is a major life activity for
purposes of the ADA. 248 Moreover, the court's "plain meaning" analysis
adopts that of the First Circuit below, holding that "the plain meaning
of the word 'major' denotes comparative importance ... .'' 249
Reasoning that "[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself," the Court concluded that
"[r]eproduction falls well within the phrase 'major life activity.' " 250 Under this rubric, lower court decisions narrowly limiting major life activities to those with economic purpose plainly are no longer viable. 251
3. Substantially limits
The third element of the Court's disability analysis, the "substantially limits" requirement, is likewise certain to have repercussions
246. 118 S. Ct. at 2204·05.
247. I d. at 2205 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84(BXiX2Xii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 41.3(bX2) (1997)).
248. 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
249. ld.
250. Id.
251. For an example of such a case, see Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d
674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996), cited in Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
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going well beyond the HIV area. Noting that the regulations provide
little guidance on the nature and degree of impact of the impairment
on the major life activity, the Court nonetheless pointed to two "independent ways" in which it found plaintiff had established that her impairment "substantially limited" her major life activity ofreproduction. 252
First, the Court noted, the substantial risk of transmission of the fatal
disease to one's unprotected sexual partner, "substantially limits an
HIV-infected individual's major life activity of sexual intercourse with
a view to reproduction. 253 Second, the significant risk an infected mother
bears of transmitting the infection to her offspring during pregnancy
and childbirth likewise was held to constitute a substantial limitation
on reproduction. 254
The Court noted, but left for another day, the very important question of the validity of the regulations that require "the substantiality of
the limitation to be assessed without regard to mitigating measures. " 255
According to the Court, even after anti-retroviral therapy, the risk of
perinatal transmission is about 8 percent. Justice Kennedy dryly concluded for the majority, "It cannot be said as a matter of law that an
8% risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child does
not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction." 256
Relying heavily on notions of probability of harm and magnitude
ofloss, the majority reasoned that the ADA covers "substantial limitations" not merely "utter inabilities" to engage in major life activities. 257 This reasoning implicitly rejects the distinction between a
partial defect or limitation present in 100 percent of the individual's
activity, and the risk of up to 100 percent defect in a small but substantial percentage of the individual's attempts to perform the activity.
Both are equated as constituting a substantial limitation. The Court
concluded that "when significant limitations result from the impairment, the definition is met even if the difficulties are not insurmountable."258 The fact that the substantial limitation may result from the
"choice" of the impaired individual to forego the activity in light of
the probability of harm and the magnitude of the risk, here, of an
HIV-infected child, does not prevent the limitation of the major life
activity from qualifying as one causally flowing sufficiently directly
from the impairment to satisfy the ADA definition of"disability." 259
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

118 S. Ct. at 2206.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.
ld. at 2206-07.
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The Court's reasoning relies both on the risks of transmission and
on the economic and legal consequences of a decision to reproduce
while HIV-infected as producing substantial limitations on the infected individual's major life activity of reproduction. 260
4. HIV asPerSe Disability-An Open Question
The Court reached its holding in the case at bar without addressing
another issue presented in the petition for certiorari, "whether HIV
infection is a per se disability under the ADA. " 261 However, the majority
bolstered its reasoning by reciting the consistent course of Rehabilitation Act and ADA agency interpretation, which had uniformly found
statutory coverage for asymptomatic individuals infected with HIV. 262
The Bragdon majority also looked to the courts' uniformly similar
stance in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act prior to enactment of the
ADA. 263 Congress' adoption of the same definition in amending the Fair
Housing Act, 264 and parallel Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations adopted pursuant to that statute, were
viewed as further confirmation of the correctness of this interpretation.265 In light of the uniformity of pre-ADA legislative, regulatory, and
judicial interpretation of the definition of disability, the Court construed
the ADA definition as constituting congressional incorporation of the
uniform prior construction. 266 In addition, the Court pointed to implementing regulations and administrative guidance issued under each
title of the ADA by the pertinent agency or agencies, including the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) interpretation
issued under Title I governing employment, in support of its holding
that even in its asymptomatic phase, HIV infection "is an impairment
which substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction." 267
While the Court declined to hold HIV-infection to be a "per se disability"
under the Act, it is difficult to discern how a defendant in a future case
involving an HIV-infected plaintiff could argue to the contrary. 268
260. ld.
261. ld. at 2207.
262. ld. at 2207-08 (citing inter alia, Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act to HIV-infected Individuals, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel264-65 (Sept. 27, 1988) (preliminary print); 5 C.F.R. § 1636.103 (1997); 7 C.F.R. § 15e.103 (1998); 22 C.F.R. § 1701.103
(1997); 24 C.F.R. § 9.103 (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 1200.103 (1997); 45 C.F.R. §§ 2301.103,
2490.103 (1997)).
263. ld. at 2208.
264. 42 u.s.c. § 3602(hX1).
265. 118 S. Ct. at 2208 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3602<hX1), 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3245 (1989),
codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (1997)).
266. ld.
267. ld. at 2208-09.
268. ld. at 2209. Were the Court in another case to reach the issue it avoided in
Bragdon and overturn the regulations which hold that the substantiality of the limitation
is to be evaluated without regard to mitigating measures, a defendant could conceivably
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5. Direct Threat
Finally, the Court addressed the asserted defense that the defendant
had the right not to treat the plaintiff because her condition "posed a
direct threat to the health or safety of others," meaning "a significant
risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of
auxiliary aids or services."269 As the Court recognized, this Title III
public accommodations defense is similar to the Title I employment
discrimination defense that an alleged "application of qualification
standards ... that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny
a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be
job-related and consistent with business necessity," where "[t]he term
'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals
in the workplace." 270 Title I, in turn, defines "direct threat" in parallel
with Title III. The term means "a significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." 271
The ADA, the amended Rehabilitation Act, 272 and the amended Fair
Housing Act, 273 all contain language incorporating a similar concept,
stemming from the Court's 1987 Rehabilitation Act decision in School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline. 214
The Bragdon Court explained that "[b]ecause few if any activities
in life are risk free," the direct threat inquiry does "not ask whether
a risk exists, but whether it is significant .• ms The degree of risk "must
be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses the treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must be based on
medical or other objective evidence." 276 The test is one of objective reasonableness "in light of the available medical evidence of the actions
of the party refusing services on the basis of an alleged direct threat. '' 277
No special deference is due to the health care provider's professional
judgment, 278 hence none would be due either to an employer's or the
argue that medical advances had rendered the impairment caused by HIV-infection one
that did not "substantially impair" a major life activity. Even this, however, is hard to
imagine, absent a cure for AIDS or at least a vaccine that effectively prevents the spread
of the disease through sexual intercourse or pregnancy. Perhaps a sexually and reproductively inactive person could be found, under such circumstances, not to be disabled.
269. I d. at 2210 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(bX3)).
270. 118 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12113(b) (1997)).
271. 42 u.s.c. § 12111(3) (1997).
272. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8XD) (1997).
273. 42 u.s.c. § 3604(0(9) (1997).
274. 480 u.s. 273, 286-87 (1987).
275. 118 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 288).
276. Id. at 2210-12 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 287).
277. Id. at 2210.
278. Id.
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employer's experts' medical judgment in a Title I employment discrimination case.
The Court nevertheless reversed the summary judgment for plaintiff on this point. 279 The Court upheld the Court of Appeals' careful
disavowal of the district court's reliance on material in a Center for
Disease Control affidavit that may not have been published at the time
the dentist refused to fill his patient's cavity outside of a hospital. 280
In the absence of any scientific evidence that treating the patient in a
hospital would have been an effective preventative measure against the
risk of HIV transmission, the Court further held, the Court of Appeals
correctly disregarded the dentist's offer to fill his HIV-infected patient's
cavity in a hospital. 281 Nevertheless, the Court reversed the summary
judgment for plaintiff on the direct threat question, regarding the two
main pieces of evidence relied on by the Court of Appeals as insufficiently unambiguous in assessing the level of risk entailed in office
treatment ofHIV-infected patients, rather than either identifying sufficient feasible practices' or ethical and professional obligations to treat
such patients. 282 Because the limited grant of certiorari had restrained
the parties from canvassing the record as a whole on this issue, the
Court, despite recognizing that other evidence in the record might be
sufficient to sustain the summary judgment for plaintiff, vacated and
remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals on the direct threat issue,
while affirming the summary judgment for plaintiff on the coverage of
her HIV-infected status as a "disability" under the ADA. 283
Justices Stevens and Breyer would have affirmed the decision below
in toto, including on the "direct threat" issue, but voted with Justice Kennedy to produce a judgment commanding majority support. 284 Justice
Ginsburg, in a briefconcurring opinion, noted her agreement with both of
the majority holdings. She affirmed on plaintiff's disability status while
"erring ... on the side of caution" and remanding the "direct threat"
question. 285 She reasoned that "[n)orationallegislator ... would require
nondiscrimination once symptoms become visible but permit discrimination when the disease, though present, is not yet visible ... .'' 286 She also
highlighted the pervasive effectofHIV infection on "life'schoices: education, employment, family and financial undertakings. " 287 Justice Gins-

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

/d.
Id.
/d.
/d.
/d.
Id.
Id.
Id.
/d.

at 2213.
at 2211.
at
at
at
at
at
at

2211-12.
2212-13.
2213 (Stevens and Breyer, JJ., concurring).
2214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
2213-14.
2213.
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burg appears implicitly to be urging per se recognition of HIV infection
as a covered disability. 288

B. Rejected Alternative Interpretations of "Major Life Activities,"
"Substantially Limits," and "Direct Threat"
Close examination of the reasoning of the dissent in this case is
especially useful in fully appreciating more subtle aspects of the holdings of the majority, as well as on its own terms.
1. "Major Life Activities"
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented from the Court's ruling that held that the plaintiff was a covered
individual with a disability under the ADA; Justice O'Connor, writing
separately, did likewise. The Chief Justice assumed arguendo that HIV
infection qualified as an "impairment. " 289 His dissenting opinion then
read the phrase "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual" as requiring an individualized inquiry not only as to the nature and extent of
the limitation, but also as to the extent to which the curtailed activity,
but for the impairment, would have been a major activity in the daily
life of the plaintiff. 290
This analysis was predicated on a narrower view of the meaning
of "major life activity." Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent rejected the
majority's understanding of"major" as indicating "comparative importance." His opinion favored, instead, the alternative dictionary definition of "greater in quantity, number, or extent." It emphasized that
the second definition is more similar in type to the items listed as major
life activities: "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 291 Acknowledging that the list was explicitly designed to be merely illustrative, the dissent nevertheless looked to the listed functions for a "common thread" running through the identified exemplars of major life
activities, extracted the idea that these activities "are repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning individual" and hence "quite different from the series of activities
leading to the birth of a child." 292 Justice O'Connor, separately dissenting in part, adopted a similar understanding of "major life activi288. See id. at 2213·14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
289. I d. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
290. I d. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Justice O'Connor summarily "agree[ d) ... that [the] claim of disability should
be evaluated on an individualized basis .... " Id. at 2217 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
291. I d. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(citing WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 702 (10th ed. 1994)).
292. I d. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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ties," to hold that the "act of giving birth to a child" does not constitute
a "major life activity" under the ADA. In her view, no further inquiry
about "impairment" and "substantially limits" was required. 293
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, deemed it necessary to express
his disagreement with the majority holding going beyond his view that
reproduction and childbirth are not a statutorily covered "major life
activity." He reasoned that there was "not a shred of record evidence
indicating that, prior to becoming infected with HIV, respondent's major
life activities included reproduction ... .'' 294 The most the record would
support, the Chief Justice asserted, was that the plaintiff had now,
"whatever her previous inclination, conclusively decided that she would
not have children."295
While the dissenting Justices avoided saying so explicitly, they
would apparently require an ADA plaintiff, seeking to establish "major
life activity," to prove the counterfactual assumption-that absent the
disability, the limited activity would in fact have been a major life
activity for the plaintiff. Thus, in the case at bar, they would have
required plaintiff to prove that had she not suffered the impairment,
she would have engaged in reproductive activity to a sufficient extent
to warrant labeling it a "major life activity" for her individually. In
light of the dissent's notion that only activities "repetitively performed
and essential in the day to day activities of a normally functioning
individual" constitute "major life activities," 296 it is unclear whether
even a woman attempting to produce a very large family and nearly
continuously pregnant or seeking to become so would qualify if she
suddenly became medically infertile. Whether Justice Rehnquist's
"normally functioning individual" could include one whose childrearing activities are both "repetitively performed" and "essential in [his
or her] day to day activities" 297 is also far from certain.
While such a narrow view of the scope of statutory coverage has
been embraced by a number of lower courts, it is difficult to square
such a view with a statute that identically covers persons disabled from
birth, from prior to commencement of gainful employment, or only after
completion of a portion of the worker's wage earning career. Even as
to a given individual, daily life activities usually vary over time. The
dissent's "individualized inquiry" does not seem to take this truism
into account. A woman's discovery that she is infertile when she is
sixteen may simply mean to her that she need not be concerned about
293.
in part).
294.
in part).
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 2217·18 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
I d. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
Id. at 2215.
Id.
See id.
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contraception if she chooses to engage in heterosexual intercourse. Her
interest in bearing children may be quite different a decade or two later.
Childrearing is for many people an absorbing activity, but only for about
two decades out of a possible four or more decade long working career.
Many other activities are more pervasive, as well as more important,
in individuals' daily lives at different points in the life cycle. Some
people engage in far more learning when they are younger, far more
working in their middle years, and less of both in retirement. Both
learning and working, nevertheless, are activities whose listing in the
regulation supports the interpretation that they must be treated as
"major" without regard to how often or how much time a particular
individual actually spends engaged in their performance.
For somebody who has never been able to perform a particular function, it is especially difficult to determine whether-always, never, or
during a particular phase in the person's life-had she or he not been
disabled, the activity would have been engaged in routinely. For example, suppose an employee grows up illiterate because of inadequate access to education, and then when attempting as an adult to learn to
read, discovers that she or he suffers from a reading impairment such
as dyslexia. Under the dissent's analysis, the impairment would not
affect a major life activity of the employee, since she or he has yet to
learn how to do it, and has not until that point spent much time engaged
in the activity.
The dissenters' construction would require those who have never
been able to perform a given life activity to show it is a major one in
their lives, on an individualized basis. 298 This seems plainly at odds
with the statutory coverage of congenitally as well as subsequently
disabled persons. Moreover, by limiting the term to essential, repetitively performed daily activities of a normally functioning individual, 299
the dissenters' interpretation would seem to exclude activities irregularly performed, intermittently daily performed, or performed daily
only in certain stages of adulthood. Finally, the dissent's definition
seems internally contradictory, or at least doubly restrictive, without
any basis to believe Congress so intended to multiply or curtail the
reach of the anti-discrimination protection. On the one hand, the individualized inquiry requirement demands that the person prove the impaired or wholly precluded activity was or would have been essential
in her or his own life. On this interpretation, activities important in
most people's lives are irrelevant if they are not crucial in the life of
the person claiming disability status. On the other hand, the "essential
in the day to day activities of a normally functioning individual" test 300
would preclude activities from qualifying, even if dominant in the life
298. See 118 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
299. See id at 2215.
300. See id
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of the putatively disabled individual, if a "normally functioning individual" could operate without needing to perform the activity repetitively
and from day to day.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined in by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, took an extremely narrow view of what constitutes a major
life activity, while Justice O'Connor reserved judgment on the issue
except to treat childbirth as falling outside of the scope of the term. All
four justices declining to join the majority, however, suggested that the
major life activity must be "major" in the plaintiff's own life, assessed
individually.
A solid, five member majority of the Court, led by Justice Kennedy,
squarely rejected the dissent's narrow construction. Instead, the Court
explicitly embraced the broader "comparative importance" interpretation of the provision, with a looser link to the plaintiff's own actual
individual activities. 301 From a broad ADA policy perspective, the difference in construction is extremely important. Many impairments affect
life activities that may qualify as "comparatively important," even if
some or many people, at a given point in their lifetimes, do not perform
them "repetitively" or daily.
From a feminist point of view, the difference in analysis is especially
significant. Pregnancy, when it occurs, changes a woman's physical
situation for nine months at a time, and childbirth and early childrearing entail further drastic changes in how parents organize their lives
and spend their time. Most feminists, male or female, would therefore
describe reproduction as a major life activity. This is true, despite the
fact that nobody engages in these activities daily throughout the course
of their lifetime. Indeed, one salient difference between the biology of
adult women and men is that women undergo physically-related, functional changes, including reproductive capacity and hormonal changes,
to a greater degree than men during the course of their working lives.
Moreover, in social practice, far more women than men take years out
of their paid working careers that they devote to unpaid childrearing
activity. Women's paid labor force participation has historically been
far more likely than men's to be intermittent.
A definition of "major life activity" that limits it to daily functions
prevalent throughout the worker's adult life or working career is one
that by definition assumes a male rather than female worker as the
norm. Since individual reproductive choices are so closely linked to
social and national reproduction, the very notion that childbirth and
childrearing is not a major life activity also seems peculiarly American;
it is hard to imagine any of the other western industrialized countries
taking such a position seriously. In enacting the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 302 Congress appears to have recognized that childbirth,
301. Id. at 2205.
302. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2654.
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childcare, and care of ailing elders and close family members are a
major life activity, at one point or another, during the working careers
of a great many Americans.
One could hail the analysis in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
as the beginnings ofjudicial reconceptualization, defining the American
citizen with a dual gender norm, one that recognizes that in this generation of workers' lives, men and women alike are both workers and parents. Justice O'Connor, in her categorical exclusion of reproduction from
the major life activity category, even more than Chief Justice
;Rehnquist, in his individualized analysis of how much daily time or
repetitive activity is involved in the process, implicitly adheres to the
contrary tradition. Justice O'Connor's reasoning, and certainly the employer's proposed interpretation covering only "aspects of a person's life
which have a public, economic, or daily character," 303 could be viewed as
reflecting the old, one dimensional view of the citizen and worker, the
stereotyped male breadwinner, and the public-private conceptual divide
between individuals' public, economic, and commercial lives, on the one
hand, and their household private lives that remain their own, on the
other. Private family activities, on this view, are insufficiently socially
important to warrant ADA protection if an impairment limits the individual's ability to continue to perform the function. The traditionally
female sphere, it is implicitly presumed, was not of concern to Congress
in enacting workplace-related legislation. Of course, one could turn this
around and suggest that it is Justice O'Connor who is the true feminist,
since she refuses to treat childrearing as a central, defining characteristic of womanhood.
2. "Substantially Limits"
The third argument of the dissent is that, assuming arguendo, reproduction were a major life activity of the plaintiff, asymptomatic HIV
infection does not "substantially limit" the activity. 304 Those infected
remain, at least for a time, physically able to engage in the activity,
including sexual relations, childbirth, and childrearing. The dissenters
would conf"me the "substantially limits" term to physical-or in the case
of mental or emotional disabilities, presumably mental or emotionallimitations on the ability to engage in the identified major life activity,
which limitations must be directly caused by the impairment. 305
In effect, the dissent writes a narrowly defined causation requirement into the statutory text. When the limitation is a "voluntary"
reaction or a "choice" of the victim of the impairment to avoid engaging
in the activity, the gap in the physical causation chain would, in the view
303. See 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
304. I d. at 2215·16 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasis added).
305. ld. at 2216.
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of these members of the Court, preclude a finding that the impairment
"substantially limits" the activity. 306 On this analysis, whenever the
impairment itself does not directly limit the ability to perform the activity, but instead greatly multiplies the odds that it will not merely be
unsuccessful but will also cause severely harmful consequences, the
individual whose "choices" are severely constrained by the impairment
is not disabled. 307 Nor apparently, may the victim of an impairment
take the future effects of her own disease on herself into account in
deciding whether she is rendered incapable of raising the child to adulthood: according to the literal reading of the dissent, a disability may
be established only to the extent that an "impairment substantially
limits (present tense) a major life activity." 308
Here, too, the majority squarely rejects the statutory construction
espoused by the dissent. The majority reasons that Abbott's HIV infection "substantially limited her ability to reproduce in two independent
ways": first, because of the risk of infection of her partner which would
be entailed by the unprotected sexual intercourse necessary to conceive;
and second, because of the risk of perinatal transmission of the infection
to any child she might conceive during pregnancy or delivery. 309 The
majority concludes: "Conception and childbirth are not impossible for
an HIV victim, but, without doubt, are dangerous to the public health.
This meets the definition of a substantiallimitation."310 Economic and
legal consequences, including health care costs for HIV-infected mother
and child and state law prohibitions against sexual intercourse by infected individuals, are also cited as bases supporting the substantial
limitation finding. 311 In summary, normal human responses by the infected individual to consequences of the impairment count as sufficiently directly and causally linked to the impairment if they entail
substantial limitation of a major life activity. When the infected person
substantially limits her or his major life activities to avoid significant
risks, caused by the impairment, of extremely adverse health consequences to third parties, or economic or legal consequences to him or
herself, this satisfies the statutory definition of disability.
Interestingly, while the dissent speaks of the need to individually examine the plaintiff's activities and the effect on them of the impairment,
the dissent's overall approach would generically and categorically exclude as many impairments from the protective ambit of disability discrimination laws as the majority's approach will categorically include.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. I d. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
309. Id. at 2206.
310. Id.
311. Id.

HeinOnline -- 14 Lab. Law. 585 1998-1999

586

14 THE

LABOR LAWYER

533 (1999)

3. Direct Threat
The final portion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion,
joined in by Justice O'Connor, addresses the "direct threat" issue. 312
The dissenters would give no extra weight to the views of public health
authorities in assessing the scientific reasonableness of the dentist's
actions. 313 As a result, while the majority remands leaving open the
possibility that reexamination of the record by the Court of Appeals
will lead to its affirmance of the summary judgment for plaintiff on the
direct threat issue, 314 the dissent regards the evidence as sufficiently
disputed to preclude summary judgment for plaintiff. 315

C. Future Implications
In an ADA employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must prove
that she is a "qualified individual with a disability" who suffered discrimination on the basis of disability as to a term or condition of employment. 316 Some ADA cases raise simple claims of disparate treatment,
that is, adverse, differential treatment of the disabled individual compared to the treatment of able-bodied workers. 317 A few raise claims of
disparate impact, challenging facially neutral employment practices
that disproportionately and disadvantageously affect persons with disabilities or with a particular disability, compared to the able-bodied. 318
Most employment-related disability discrimination cases, however, in312. ld. at 2216-18.
313. I d. at 2216-17 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasis added).
314. ld. at 2213.
315. I d. at 2217 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
316. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(8), 12112. See, e.g., Gaul v. Lucent Technologies,
Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998).
317. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(bX1). See, e.g., Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook
County, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997) (mentally impaired employee fired for violent
threats was held to have been fired because of conduct, not mental disability, even if
employee's conduct stemmed from disability, hence no disability-based disparate treatment occurred); Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc. 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (employee
discharged because employer perceived plaintiff's heart attack as disabling condition);
McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1992) (Rehabilitation Act) (disparate
treatment in application of leave of absence policy against employee whose disability
was inability to bear children); Carter v. Casa Central, 849 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1988)
(Rehabiliation Act) (failure to reinstate employee to job after disability-related leave of
absence found unlawful because motivated by employee's disability); Price v. S-B Tool,
75 F.3d 362 (8th Cir. 1996) (epileptic employee terminated for violating employer's 3 per
cent no-fault absenteeism ceiling when she failed to resort to employer's generous leave
of absence policy, held not terminated because of her disability but because of her absenteeism).
318. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(bX1), 12112(bX3), 12112(bX6), 12112(bX7). For
example, see Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir. 1998) (challenging employer's one year ceiling on medical leaves of absence on theory it had a disparate
impact on individuals with disabilities). See also Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing potential ADA disparate impact
theory, but noting that plaintiff had waived it).
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volve disputes over the employer's duty to provide the worker with
"reasonable accommodation," so long as it can be done "without undue
hardship" to the employer. 319
A "qualified individual with a disability" is a worker who suffers
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the worker's major life activities and who can, with or without reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of the job the
worker holds or seeks to hold. 320
The courts have until now usually proceeded by requiring plaintiff
to: (1) prove she suffers from an "impairment"; (2) point to one or more
activities which the worker contends are her affected "major life activities"; (3) demonstrate that the activity is "substantially limited" because of the impairment; and (4) show that she is capable of performing
the essential functions of the job at issue, identifying suitable reasonable accommodations if necessary. 321
Narrow lower court interpretations of one or more of the first three
elements have constrained many plaintiffs to identify "work" as their
substantially limited major life activity. For many plaintiffs, relying
on "work" is an error fatal to their lawsuit. Unlike other major life
activities, as to which partial but significant impairment is sufficient,
when "work" is the activity, the regulations impose more demanding
requirements on plaintiffs. Either the worker must be unable to perform
a fairly narrow occupational category, say, surgeon, electrician, or typist, across a range of businesses and industries, or the worker must be
unable to perform a wide range of jobs, e.g., most unskilled or semiskilled operative positions within a given industry. 322 The intent of the
regulations is to preclude the professional track and field runner, whose
knees deteriorate to the point where he or she can no longer produce
Olympic-caliber performances, from claiming that her ability to "work"
319. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(bX5XA), 12111(9), 12111(10). See, e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Central School Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 135-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases
regarding allocation of evidentiary burdens as to reasonable accommodation without
undue hardship); Beck v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (3d
Cir. 1996) (employer held liable for failure to provide reasonable accommodation only
when it bears responsibility for breakdown of interactive process of identifying suitable
forms of accommodation for employee); Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge,
Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1997)(employerfound to have offered employee five
types of reasonable accommodation, held not required to provide further accommodation;
employee not entitled to form of accommodation of her choice); Chiari v. City of League
City, 920 F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1991) (when constuction inspector's disability rendered
his gait unsteady so he could no longer perform an essential element of his job, climbing
buildings, reasonable accommodation did not encompass requiring the city to create a
new position including only tasks he was able to perform).
320. 42 u.s.c. § 12111(8).
321. See, e.g., Halperin v. Abacus Technology Copr., 128 F.3d 191, 198 (4th Cir. 1997).
This formulation differs little from that adopted by the Court in Bragdon. See supra text
accompanying note 232.
322. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(jX3Xi)(1997). See, e.g., Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173,
1176 (lOth Cir. 1997).
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is "substantially limited" when she can still walk, run faster than most
people, and perform non-athletic jobs. 323 Courts often insist, however,
that plaintiffs claiming their activity of "work" is "substantially limited" demonstrate that absent reasonable accommodation, they are incapable of carrying out the responsibilities in quite a broad range of
positions. 324 Even if a plaintiff can surmount this hurdle, she is likely
to do so in a fashion that will work against her success at the next step,
in showing that with or without reasonable accommodation, she can
perform the essential functions of her job. 325 It is little wonder than
only a relative handful of plaintiffs survive their attempt to run this
gauntlet. This is one, if not the only, explanation for the remarkable
statistic of the recent ABA study finding that employers have been
winning about ninety-two percent of fully-litigated ADA employment
discrimination cases. 326
Bragdon assists plaintiffs in several ways to escape from this bind.
First, the decision adopts the broad "comparative importance" defini323. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.2(j), App. (professional baseball pitcher). "The inability
to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major
life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(jX3Xi). The second portion of the provision
interpreting "substantially limits" as it applies to the major life activity of work focuses
on the range of other jobs from which the individual is excluded because of her or his
impairment. See id.
324. See, e.g., Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 D.3d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir. 1998)
(employee's inability to perform lifting twenty pounds on a frequent basis, or forty-five
pounds occasionally along with evidence that employee "will need ... retraining into a
position where he does not have to stand for prolonged periods, held insufficient to support
a finding of substantial limitation of major life activity of work or of lifting); Bolton v.
Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939,943-44 (lOth Cir. 1994)(evidence of nature, severity, duration
and impact of employee's impairment, plus workers' compensation finding of 9 per cent
permanent partial disability in one foot and 29 per cent permanent partial disability in
the other, does not suffice to show employee significantly restricted from performing
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes); McKay v. Toyota Motor
Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 371-73 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that employee's carpal
tunnel syndrome does "not significantly restrict her ability to perform the class of jobs
at issue, manufacturing jobs; at [most) ... her impairment disqualifies her from only
the narrow range of assembly line manufacturing jobs that require repetitive motion or
frequent lifting of more than two pounds;" she is therefore not substantially limited in
her major life activity of work). See also id. at 374 ("The majority ... holds that an
individual who provided competent and unimpeached expert testimony that her physical
impairment disqualifies her from performing all heavy duty jobs, all medium duty jobs,
as well as those light and sedentary jobs requiring repetitive motion, does not, as a matter
of law, have a substantial impairment of the major life activity of working.... I am
unable to reconcile this conclusion with the facts or with what I view as a reasonable
interpretation of the ADA ... ")(Hillman, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
325. See, e.g., Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997) (em·
ployee either not disabled, because could perform too many types of work, or not qualified,
because even with accommodation, could not perform essential functions of his existing
position, or both).
326. See Disabilities Discrimination: Overwhelming Majority ofADA Job Suits Fail
in Court, American Bar Association Survey Finds, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 119,
at D7 (June 22, 1998).
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tion of major life activity, making it easier for plaintiffs to point to other
non-work activities, even if not listed in the regulations. Second, the
Court relaxes both the tightness and the directness of the causal link
the plaintiff must show between the impairment and the limitation of
a major life activity. Cessation of the life activity to avoid serious economic or legal harm to plaintiff, or to avoid physical risks of grave
bodily harm whether to plaintiff or to third parties, will suffice. This
is true, even if plaintiff is not directly, physically incapacitated from
performing the major life activity, in whole or in part, by the impairment
itself. Not only does this ease plaintiff's burden in showing "substantial
limitation," indirectly it further broadens the range of non-work major
life activities to which a plaintiff with a given impairment can successfully point.
Finally, the Bragdon Court has clarified the definition of "physical
impairment" by adopting a broad, literal interpretation of the regulation327 that includes any disorder affecting at least one ofthe following
body systems: "neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine." 328
The Court accepts "impairments" at the molecular and cellular
level that demonstrably, biochemically affect a major body system
long before the damage manifests itself in palpable physical symptoms. This, too, further broadens ADA plaintiffs' possibilities of identifying impairments that physically or behaviorally limit substantially a major life activity of the plaintiff's. Moreover, such
impairments help plaintiffs avoid contributing to their own demise
via evidence tending to prove that the worker's impairment is likely
to interfere with her ability to perform essential functions of the job,
even with reasonable accommodation.
The Court's "direct threat" holding, on the other hand, will have
only minor equivocal impact on the case law as it has heretofore developed. The Bragdon Court thoroughly rejected the dentist's medical professional deference argument:
As a health care professional, petitioner had the duty to assess the
risk of infection based on the objective, scientific information available
to him and others in his profession. His belief that a significant risk
existed, even if maintained in good faith, would not relieve him from
liability.... [P]etitioner receives no special deference simply because
he is a health care professional. 329
327. 118 S. Ct. at 2202.
328. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3GX2Xi) (1997), quoted in Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h), the Title I regulation, contains virtually identical wording. See supra notes
234-238 and accompanying text.
329. ld. at 2210.
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Medical deference arguments, however, had not previously gained
any broad acceptance in the lower courts. Likewise, little change was
made in prevailing law by the majority holding, 330 accepted by the dissenters as well, 331 that the existence of a "significant risk to the health
or safety ofothers that cannot be eliminated by" reasonable accommodation332 "must be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses the treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must
be based on medical or other objective evidence."333
In instances where the scientific evidence regarding risk of transmission or contagion, or regarding the effectiveness of preventative
measures, is uncertain or conflicting, the majority's remand on this
point may modestly expand the scope of the potential defense. The defendant's actions must be shown to be "reasonable in light of the available
medical evidence"; the views of public health authorities on the matter
receive special deference, but are not controlling. 334 "A health care professional [and presumably, an employer acting on the basis of advice
of a health care professional] who disagrees with the prevailing medical
consensus may refute it by citing a credible scientific basis for deviating
form the accepted norm." 335 All evidence must be judged based on its
availability to the medical decision-maker at the time of the challenged
decision. 336 The Court remanded to permit the Court of Appeals to reexamine whether, carefully focusing on information available at the appropriate time to the defendant, enough credible, objective scientific
evidence had been presented to support a dispute of material fact as to
the "direct threat" defense. 337 This fact-dependent analysis may nevertheless suggest a slight broadening of summary judgment standards
in favor of those asserting the defense. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that by its own terms, the defense can only be raised in an extremely
narrow category of cases.
Bragdon v. Abbott is the Court's shakedown cruise under the ADA.
Because the Court construes several key provisions, and resolves nearly
all interpretative disputes in favor of plaintiffs, the decision will almost
certainly be perceived in future years as a seminal disability rights
case, governing discrimination in employment as well as public accommodation.

330. See id. at 2201.
331. Id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 2218 (O'Connor, J., joining in this portion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion).
332. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(bX3) (Title llD; 12111(3) (Title D.
333. 118 S. Ct. at 2210.
334. ld. at 2211.
335. Id.
336. ld. at 2211-12.
337. Id. at 2212.
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VII. Unexpected Observations: Private Employers as Losers,
Public Employers as Winners, and Justice Kennedy's
Pivotal Role in this Term's Decisions
A. Winners and Losers
Some peculiarities may be observed about this term's labor and
employment law rulings. Private employers lost all cases in which they
were defendants against individual employee338 or pension plan administrator339 plaintiffs. General Motors could not even manage to enforce
the injunctive provisions of its prior wrongful termination lawsuit settlement agreement to prevent its former employee from testifying
against it. 340 On the other hand, unions fared even worse than employers, winning no cases in which they were parties. 341 When private employers litigated opposite unions or government agencies, their chances
of success therefore improved mightily. They won both cases involving
labor-management relations issues. 342 The former coal company's challenge to government-mandated payments into the governmentallyadministered benefits trust fund was similarly successful. 343
Public employers and their officials as employment decision-makers
fared far better than private sector employers. In the cases where rules
applicable to all employment discrimination defendants, public or private, were applied to a public employer, it suffered the same types of
losses as its private sector counterparts. A public employer lost one of
the sexual harassment Title VII cases, Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 344
as well as Hetzel v. Prince William County, 345 requiring a retrial option to
satisfy Seventh Amendment concerns when an appellate court imposes
remittitur on a plaintiff who has won a substantial jury verdict in employment discrimination (or any other type) of litigation.
On the other hand, when public employers or their officials litigated
defenses to liability specific to governmental actors, they were highly
successful. Thus, in Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 346 municipal government officials were able to wrap themselves in the mantle of absolute legislative
immunity to preclude any pretext or mixed motives inquiry into the
reasons underlying their ostensibly legislative decision to eliminate
the employee's position from the city budget, thereby effectively terminating the plaintiff's employment.
338. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Geissal, 118 S. Ct. 1869 (1998); Oncale, 118 S.
Ct. 998 (1998); Oubre, 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998).
339. Bay Area Laundry Pension Trust Fund, 118 S. Ct. 542 (1997).
340. Baker v. General Motors, 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998).
341. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998); Textron, 118 S. Ct. 1626
(1998); Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998).
342. Textron, 118 S. Ct. 1626 (1998); Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998).
343. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
344. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
345. 118 S. Ct. 1210 (1998).
346. 118 S. Ct. 966 (1998).
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In LaChance v. Erickson, 347 the federal government persuaded the
Court that there was no due process or statutory problem in punishing
a government employee with discharge for the misconduct oflying during a government investigation into an under lying allegation of misconduct. The criminal case against union defendants, Brogan v. United
States, 348 is roughly analogous to permitting government use of criminal
sanctions to coerce those under investigation for criminal violations to
respond truthfully or remain silent under government investigator's
questioning, on pain of criminal punishment despite the lack offormal
oath and inapplicability of criminal perjury law.
One could also see evidence of a trend protective of government
interests in the Court's Title IX ruling, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District, 349 narrowly restricting circumstances under which a
local school board or other educational institution may be held liable on
vicarious liability grounds for sexual harassment of students by school
employees, their teachers. Gebser imposed a requirement that the students complain to school system authorities empowered to respond to
such complaints as a precondition to imposing private damage liability
on the school board. The Court further precluded liability if the authorities respond to a complaint with more than "deliberate indifference"
to the teacher's reported misconduct. 350 One may profitably contrast
Gebser with this term's Title VII sexual harassment imputed liability
precedents, Ellerth 351 and Faragher. 352 It is clear that the Court took
an approach under Title IX far more protective of public education institutional interests than would be the case in employment litigation,
which may be brought against private as well as public employers under
Title VII. 353 All in all, at least in matters related to the employment
relationship, the Court has displayed considerably more solicitude for
the perceived special needs of government employers and their officials
as opposed to private sector employers.
Another public employment case, Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v.
Schacht, 354 runs partially counter to this trend. However, in the Supreme Court, the Schacht case probably was not perceived as an employment law matter. While the case arose as an employment termination
cause of action, substantive wrongful discharge law was not before the
Court on certiorari. Before the Supreme Court, Schacht solely concerned
issues of general applicability to all cases involving state defendants
347. 118 S. Ct. 753 (1998).
348. 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
349. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
350. Id. at 1993.
351. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
352. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
353. The comparison between the Court's approach under Title IX and Title Vll is
spelled out in greater detail in Weiss, supra note 9, at 279-87.
354. 118 S. Ct. 2047 (1998).
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sued for federal constitutional violations in state courts. The Schacht
Court addressed the issue of how to apply federal removal jurisdiction
law when one of the removing defendants is a state entitled to assert
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff, a prison guard, had been terminated, allegedly for
workplace theft, and had sued in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
both the State, as his former employer, and several prison officials in
both their official and personal capacities. The defendants removed the
case to federal court, and there the defense of Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity was asserted on behalf of both the State and the
officials as to claims against them in their official capacities. The district
court dismissed those claims, and in addition granted summary judgment on the remaining claims against the officials acting in their personal capacities.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had
lacked jurisdiction over the entire action. The presence of the claims
subject to the Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court of Appeals reasoned,
not only divested the court of authority to resolve those claims, but
precluded the entire case from being removable. The Supreme Court,
in a unanimous opinion by Justice Breyer, reversed. The Court held that
the fact that the state defendants had the right to waive the sovereign
immunity defense indicated that at the time of removal, the entire case
was removable as to all defendants; the district court's jurisdiction was
not impaired until the defendants after removal asserted the sovereign
immunity defense. Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurring opinion
in which he pointed out that the difficult, partially circular problem of
whether sovereign immunity is in the nature of an affirmative defense
or an outright deprivation of federal jurisdiction could be best avoided
by construing the defendant's participation in the removal as equivalent
to a waiver of the defense. Again displaying that independent cast of
mind that appears to be the hallmark of his decisions this term related
to labor and employment law, Justice Kennedy in effect invited future
litigants to present a sovereign immunity waiver argument in a future
removal case.
B. The Pivotal Role of Justice Kennedy
It would not be an exaggeration to say that Justice Kennedy dominated the Court's decision-making in the labor and employment law
field this term. Many of this term's employment-related cases pivot on
Justice Kennedy's position. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinions in Ellerth, 355 one of the two Title VII sexual harassment vicarious
liability decisions, Bragdon, 356 the major ADA case, and Oubre, 357 the
355. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
356. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
357. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998).
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ADEA waiver case. He provided the critical fifth vote, concurring in the
judgment but declining to support the plurality on the takings theory
in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,358 his concurring opinion in Wisconsin
Department of Corrections v. Schachf59 issued an important invitation
to future litigants, and in Gebser, 360 the Title IX sexual harassment
case, he provided the fifth vote in support of the Court's position severely
restricting school systems' vicarious liability for sexual harassment of
students by teachers. Only in Allentown Mack 361 was he in the dissent,
and then only on the portion of Justice Scalia's decision accepting as
rational and consistent with the Act the NLRB's good faith reasonable
doubt standard for employer polling of employee union sentiment; he
was with the five member majority on the later portion of the opinion
overturning the NLRB's factual finding that the employer lacked an
objective basis to support its good faith doubt.
This term, Justice Kennedy voted frequently in labor and employment-related cases with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
to form a majority. In the two 7-2 cases, Ellerth362 and Faragher, 363 the
paired sexual harassment vicarious liability cases, the Chief Justice
and Justice O'Connor joined the other five. Justice Kennedy wrote the
Court's opinion in Ellerth, in moderating tones, while plainly heavily
influencing Justice Souter's somewhat less restrained majority opinion
in Faragher. The two decisions are mutually cross-referenced and incorporate identical language as to the employer's affirmative burden of
proof regarding hostile environment claims involving supervisor's activities. Only Justices Thomas and Scalia did not find the middle ground
defined by Justice Kennedy (and Souter) to be acceptable.
In several cases, the vote was 5-4, with Justice Kennedy casting the
decisive choice between two rather stable blocks consisting of Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, on the (very loosely defined)
left, and the Chief Justice, together with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas on the right. The tone of the opinions, as well as the growing
stability of these voting blocks, suggests an increasing polarization between the two wings of the Court, with the middle ground frequently
mediated by Justice Kennedy.
In assessing the term's overall corpus oflabor and employment decisions, Justice Scalia's role this year was also noteworthy. He wrote the
majority opinion in two very important decisions: Allentown Mack, 364
the NLRA polling case, and Oncale, 365 the Title VII same sex sexual
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
118 S. Ct. 2047 (1998).
Gebser v. Lago Independent School District, 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998).
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
118 S. Ct. 818 (1998).
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
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harassment case. Justice Scalia's literal interpretivist approach to
construing statutes was on display in the labor and employment law
decisions he wrote for a majority of the Court, as well as in his separate
concurring and dissenting opinions. 366 Resort to the dictionary as authority for interpretation of positive law is well on the way to becoming
habitual on this Court.
While other Justices authored two or more majority opinions in the
labor and employment law field, these were typically technical decisions
in which the Court was unanimous or nearly so. Without undervaluing
the significance of key decisions written by other Justices, particularly
Justice Souter's majority opinion in Faragher367 and Justice Breyer's
large corpus of important concurring or dissenting opinions this term in
Textron, 368 Allentown Mack, 369 Oubre, 370 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 371
and Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller, 372 one would have to say that
Justice Kennedy was the dominant figure in labor and employment
law for this Supreme Court term. Given the division within the Court,
it would appear likely that his role will persist in years to come.

366. See note 197 supra and accompanying text, identifying Justice Scalia's opinions
last term that cited the dictionary as authority.
367. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
368. Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div'n, Avco Corp. v. United Auto Workers, 118 S. Ct. 1626, 1632 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
369. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 833 (1998) (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
370. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, 118 S. Ct. 838, 843 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring).
371. 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2161 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
372. 118 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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